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1. SUMMARY: Whether plies to a college which 
receives no direct federal which enrolls students who 
~
receive basic educational opportunity grants. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Title IX provides that: 
( 
- 2 -
No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 
20 u.s.c. s 1681. 
20 U.S.C. S 1682 authorizes the termination of federal funds to 
any program that does not comply with S 1681. 
Department of Education regulations require each recipient 
of federal financial aid to file an Assurance of Compliance, in 
which it agrees to comply, the the extent applicable to it, with 
Title IX. 
In 1976, the Department of Education began efforts to secure 
~
an Assurance from petr Grove. Grove refused to execute the 
Assurance, asserting that it received no federal financial 
~ssistance. After a hearing, the department terminated grants 
And loans to students attending Grove. 
Grove brought this action, together with four of its 
students who received federal grants, seeking a declaration that 
the department's termination was void, and an injunction 
prohibiting the department from requiring Grove to file an 
Assurance of Compliance as a condition of preserving its 
eligibility for the grant and loan programs. 
v 
The DC granted petrs' motion for summary judgment. The DC 
held that Title IX authorizes a termination of grants only upon 
an actual finding of sex discrimination, a finding which the 
department had not made. It also held that the department was 
barred by the Due Process Clause from terminating the grants 




tdversely affected. On appeal and cross-appeal, the court of 
appeals re~erse~. <; 
The ~ held that federal student aid made Grove a recipient 
of federal financial a~sistance within the meaning of Title IX. 
It relied on the language of the statute, the legislative 
history, and case law under Tit~e VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. The CA rejected petrs' argument that, since federal 
student aid is not earmarked for any specific educational 
activity, applying Title IX to this case would necessarily be 
inconsistent with the "program-specific" nature of Title IX. The 
CA stated, in dictum, that when the federal government furnishes 
non-earmarked aid to an institution, the institution as a whole 
is the "program" receiving federal financial assistance. Judge 
!Cker, con~urring in the judgment, declined to adopt the dicta. 
'-
The CA also rejected petrs' argument that enforcement of 
Title IX would infringe upon the First Amendment rights of it and 
its students, holding that Congress has the power to impose 
reasonable conditions upon grants of federal financial 
~ 
assistance. Finally, the CA rejected the DC's conclusions that 
assistance could be terminated only upon a finding of actual 
discrimination, and that the department could terminate the 
grants without affording hearings to affected students, citing 
~orth Haven Board of Education v. Bell, u.s. __ (1982), 
and O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 u.s. 773 (1980). 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend this case presents a simple 
issue: did Congress intend to subject to institution-wide Title 




assistance, but which enrolls students who receive basic 
educational opportunity grants directly from the government. 
This decision conflicts with North Haven Board of Education v. 
Bell, u.s. (1982) and with decisions of other CAs. 
Congress did not intend that a college which does not operate any 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, and 
whose only connection to federal aid is its admission of students 
who receive federal grants, would be subject to Title IX 
regulation. In North Haven, this Court rejected the CA2's 
{ assertion that the regulatory authority of the Department of 
Education under Title IX was institution-wide. "[A]n agency's 
authority under Title IX both to promulgate regulations and to 
terminate funds is subject to thJ 1program specific limitatiori' of" - --- ---------
§ 1681, 1682. 102 S.Ct. at 1926. The CA3 disregarded this 
'-..-
holding and held instead that any federal aid to students 
attending an educational institution would subject the whole 
institution to Title IX regulation. 
Petrs contend the decision below also conflicts with Rice v. 
President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336 (CAl 
1981), which rejected the arguments accepted below and held that 
Title IX applies only to the specific program receiving federal 
financial assistance. Petrs also contend the decision below 
conflicts with University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F.Sup. 321 
(Ed. Va. 1982), which the department has refused to appeal. 
There, the court held that Title IX did not apply to a private 
university's athletic program where the only types of federal 
sistance received by the university were general students 
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1ssistance and a $1,900 library grant. Petrs also contend there 
is a conflict with theCA 5's interpretation of identical 
programatic language under Title VI in Board of Public 
Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Fin~h, 414 F.2d 1068, 
1077 (CA 5 1969). 
Petrs contend that the department's approach would have been 
adopted in the initial version of Title IX introduced by Senator 
Bayh. However, Congress rejected this approach and adopted a 
program specific statute. Regulation is permissible in those 
programs receiving federal aid, but is impermissible where a 
program receives no assistance. Congress did not intend that 
assistance given directly to students without intervention or 
selection by the educational institution would subject the entire 
{ ~stitution to control. Because student assistance programs are 
so wide spread, to find otherwise would nullify Title IX's 
program-specific directive for virtually every educational 
institution in the country. 
The SG contends that petrs' argument is with the dicta -----rejected by Judge Becker, and not with the judgment below. The 
actual holding below is that Grove must file the Assurance of 
Compliance required by the Title IX regulations because it is a 
recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of 
Title IX by virtue of its participation in the Basic Educational 
Opportunity Grant Program. This holding does not conflict with ~ ~ ~ 
any decision of this Court or of any other CA. The decision 
rl/1..<...-0 
~\ 
( below is consistent with Hillsdale College v. HEW, No. 80-3207 
A 6 December 16, 1982), which held that Hillsdale College, 
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which receives no federal financial aid except through its 
participation in student aid programs, is a recipient of federal 
financial assistance within the meaing of Title IX. The only 
requirement at issue in this case is that the institution execute 
an Assurance of Compliance. The department believes that 
Assurances of Compliance are written and construed so as not to 
apply automatically to an institution as a whole. The apply only 
to those programs and activities of an institution that receive 
federal financial assistance. No court has held that the 
department may not require such an Assurance • 
. "-- ~-
The SG concedes that the dicta to which petrs object may] 
conflict with this Court's decision in North Haven, and do 
conflict with the decisions of several other CAs. This case does 
( ot, however, present the conflict. Since this case was decided, 
( 
the CA 3 has decided Haffer v. Temple University, 688 F.2d 14 
(1982), which applied the dicta from this case in a holding. The 
resulting conflict among the CAs is to the proper interpretation 
of program specificity is, however, not presented in this case. 
[Haffer was decided on September 7, 1982. It appears that no 
cert. petn was filed.] 
The SG contends, finally, that petrs' First Amendment 
argument is entirely without merit for the reasons stated by the 
CA, and that the issue listed as a question presented, but not 
discussed in the body of the petition, whether the department may 
terminate assistance because of a refusal to execute an Assurance 
of Compliance, rather than because of a finding of actual 
- 7 -
1iscrimination, does not merit review because there is no 
conflict. 
4. DISCUSSION: The SG is correct that the statements of 
the CA challenged by petrs in the body of the petn are dicta. If 
~ ~ 
the SG's representations concerning the meaning of an Assurance 
of Compliance are correct, the judgment in this case does not 
present any question worthy of review here. It is not 
unreasonable to ask institutions to comply with Title IX in any 
program they run that receives federal financial assistance. I 
suspect that this interpretation of Assurances of Compliance 
originated in the current administration, but do not doubt that 
it is accurate as of now. The Court should wait for a case that 
squarely presents the issue on which there is a conflict. I 
!Commend denial. 
' ~ 
There is a response. 
2/2/83 
JB 
Jaffe Op in petn. 
ebruary 18, 1983 




GROVE CITY COLLEGE, ET AL. 
v. 
MEMORANDUM 






The program specific issue is raised in No. 82-862, 
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. LeStrange, Feb. 18 conference, List. 3, 
Sheet 2. The pool memo in that case recommends considering these 
cases together and possibly granting on the program specif i c 
issue in Grove. For the reasons stated in my pool memo ln _<;;rqve, 
I do not believe that case should be granted. If the Co::r t. 
~tJishes to resolve the conflict on program-specificity, H . :- ·~ ~ , l' 1.d 
;ant on that issue in LeStrange. 
~ February 9, 1983 . 
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The Program-Specific Reach of Title IX 
At midnight on June 30, 1982 the ratification period for the proposed 
Equal Rights Amendment expired. 1 Opponents of the amendment had argued 
that equal rights for women could best be achieved on a statutory basis, and 
that amending the Constitution was unnecessary .2 Moreover, existing statutes 
were viewed as sufficiently protective of women's rights. One of the most 
significant of these statutes is title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 3 
which prohibits sex discrimination in "any education program or a..:tivity 
receiving federal financial assistance. " 4 
The courts have failed to develop a coherent interpretation of title IX's 
reach into schools5 receiving federal aid. Nowhere is the conflict in the case 
law more pronounced than on the question of whether a school's receipt of 
student-aid funds triggers title IX coverage. Recently, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, in University of Richmond v. Re/1, 11 inter-
preted title IX's scope narrowly and held that the receipt of such funds does 
not bring a school within title IX's reach. 7 The Justice Department decided 
not to appeal the decision; it found the district court judge's interpretation 
irrefutable." Nevertheless, three days after the Justice Department decided not 
to appeal, the Third Circuit held in favor of the government in Grove City 
I . Sec G. Gunther, Cases and Material!. on Constitutional Law 157 (Supp . 1982). On 
January 3, t983 the Equal Rights Amendment was again introduced into Congre,~. H.R.J. Rc!t . 
I, 98th Cong ., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rcc. 1146 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1983). 
2. See Reagan's Women, New Republic, Oct. 28, 1981, at 6. 
3. 20 u.s.c . §§ 1681 - 1685 (1976). 
4. Section 90l(a) provides that : "No person in the United States shall, on the ba~is of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 'ubjcctcd to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving federal financial as\i'>tancc . . .. " 20 U .S.C. * 
1681(a) (1976) . Section 901 also exempts several types of educational entities from title IX 
coverage . I d. § 1681 (a)( I )-(9). Section 902 authorizes federal administrative enforcement of the § 
901 prohibition . ld. § 1682. Sec infra note 63. Judicial review of agency action can be obtained 
under § 903 . ld . § 1683. Section 904, id. § 1684, prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
blindness or visual impairment, and under § 905, id. § 1685, any program or activity whose 
federal support is extended through contracts of insurance or guaranty is excluded from title IX 
coverage. 
5. The term "school," as used in this Note, refers to an educational entity that controls its 
own budget. Thus, a college, an entire university and a public school district can be "schools." 
This concept is meant to be distinguished from the statutory term "institution," which defines the 
scope of several of the exemptions in section 90l(a) . Sec 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1'.176); 117 Cong. 
Rec. 39,262 (1971) (statement of Rep. Dellenback). 
6. 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
7. ld. at 333. 
8. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1982, at A20, col. 3. But sec Letter from Clarence Pendleton, 
Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, to Terrel Bell, Secretary of Education 
(August 10, 1982) (expressing concern that the acceptance of the University of Richmond court's 
theories would "decimate civil rights protection in education") (on file at the offices of the 
Columbia Law Review). 
1210 
-· 
REACH OF TITLE IX 1211 
College v. Be/1. 9 There, the court gave title IX an expansive reach, holding 
that the college's receipt of student-aid funds did trigger title IX coverage of 
the entire college. 10 The Third Circuit's analysis explicitly took issue with the 
interpretation of the University of Richmond court. 11 f-inally, only four 
months after Grove City College v. Bell was decided, the Sixth Circuit an-
swered this question in a third way. In Hillsdale College v. IIEW, 12 the court 
held that the receipt of student-aid funds leads to title IX coverage, but only 
of part of the school. 13 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Grove 
City College v. Bell to resolve this confusion. 11 
This Note suggests a new approach to title IX. The Note first analyzes the 
conflicting case law interpreting "program or activity receiving Federal finan -
cial assistance." Before proposing a definition of "program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance," the Note explores the scope of the Deparl -
ment's authority to enforce title IX. A hitherto unrecognized distinction 
emerges between the scope of the Department's authority to terminate federal 
aid and the scope of its authority to effectuate title IX by other means. 
Drawing on this distinction and on title IX's statutory language and legislative 
history, the Note then concludes that the term "program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance" should be defined as that portion of a school 
actually supported by a specific grant statute's funds. Finally, the Note out-
lines how this interpretation should be applied to I hree types of grant statute 
funding: categorical aid, nonearmarked aid, and student aid. 
I. THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE REACH OF TITLE IX 
Soon after Congress enacted title IX eleven years ago, a sharp contro-
versy1~ developed concerning the extent of its reach into schools receiving 
federal aid. The controversy erupted when the Department 111 proposed regula-
9. 687 F .2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (19X3) (Nn. H2-792) . 
10. ld. at 700. 
II. ld. ::11700 n.27. 
12. 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982). 
13. ld. at 430. 
14. 103 S. Ct. 1181 {1983) (82- 792). 
15 . The controversy has frequently focused on whether title IX covers athletics. The focu~ on 
athletics stems from the political clout of those associated with intercollegiate athletics. Sec Sex 
Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on l'o~u,econdary Educ . of the 
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong., l!.t s~ss. 184 (1975) (statement of Rep. 
Buchanan) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination Regulations Hearings]. In addition, blatant 
~ex discrimination nourishes in educational athletics. ld. at 77-7'1. (statement of Kathy Kelly, 
President, U.S. National Student Association). 
16. In 1980, title IX enforcement authority was tran\fcrred to the newly created Departmcm 
of Education by§ 30l(a)(3) of the Department of Educ;uion Organilation Art. Pub. 1.. No. 96-
88,93 Stat. 677,678 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (Supp. V 19!!1)) . Thi~ Note will usc thc 
term "the Dcpartmcnt" to refer to both the Department of l ~ducatinn and IIEW. The latter 
controlled federal funds for education prior to 1980 and wrote the regulations effectuating title 
IX . 
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tions to effectuate the statute. 17 The courts have reached divergent results as to 
the scope of the statute's coverage.'H 
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in "any education program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance." 111 The controversy concerns the 
congressional intent underlying this statutory language. 20 Last term, the Su-
preme Court, in North Haven Board of Education v. Be/1, 21 concluded that 
title IX's reach is limited by its program-speci fie language- its program-
specificity. 22 In other words, title IX prohibits only discrimination occurring 
within a federally funded "program or activity." The Court distinguished 
program-specificity from what this Note terms the strict institutional ap-
proach.2J Under the latter, if a school receives any type of federal aid, the 
entire school is automatically covered by title IX. The Court indicated that the 
strict institutional approach was inconsistent with the language and legi~lativc 
history of the statute. 24 Nonetheless the Court expressly declined to determine 
the exact meaning of program-spccificity. 2" The bound(lrics of title IX's reach 
therefore remain unclear. 211 
t7 . 40 Fed . Reg. 24,121! (1975) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106 (191!1)). Sec generally Sex 
Discrimination Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, at 1- 2 (describing the purpo>c of the 
hearings as a review of the regulations); Comment, HEW's Regulation Under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B. Y .U. L. Rev. 133 ( 1976) (arguing 
that the regulations exceed the Department's statutory authority) )herein a ftcr cttcJ as Comment. 
Ultra Vires]. 
18. Sec infra notes 27-61 and accompanying text. Compare Othen v. Ann Arbor Schoollld . , 
507 f . Supp. 1376 (E .D. Mich. 1981) (construing the reach of title IX narrowly), aff'd on other 
grounds, 699 F .2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983), with Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp . 531 (E.D . Pa . 
1981) (construing the reach of title IX expansively), atTd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir . 1982) . 
19. 20 U .S.C. § 168l(a) (1976) . for the full text of title IX's prohibition, sec supra note 4 . 
20. The prindpal aim of statutory interpretation is a~ccrtaining and cffe~tuating the legisla-
tive intent. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975). Sec generally Kernochan, Statutory 
Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 Dalhousie L.J. 333, 344 (1976). 
21. 456 u.s. 512 (1982). 
22. I d. at 537. 
23. I d. Proponents of an expansive intcrprclation of title IX have argued tlwt Iitle IX b.: 
;tpplicd on the basis of thi' strkt inslitntional approach . Sec, e.g., Othcn v. Ann Arbor Sd10ol 
lid., 507 F. Supp . 1376, 13KO (E. D. Mkh. 19!11) (plaintiff a'scrted strict institutional approa~h), 
aff'd on other grounJs, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 19!!3); d . Yakin v. University of Illinois, 508 F. 
Supp. 848, 850 (N .D. Ill. 1981) (strict institutional approach followed in enfordng title Vlof th(• 
Civil Rights Act of 1964) . 
24. North !Iaven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,536- 38 (1982). 
25. ld.at 1927. 
26. The lower court interpretations of program-specificity after North 1/uven conflict. Sec 
supra note 18 (examples of pre-North Haven conflict). Compare Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 
F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982).(construing the reach of Iitle IX narrowly), with Grove City College v. 
Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982) (construing the reach of title IX broadly in the same situation), 
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792). While the majority of the courts addressing the 
issue have construed title IX's re:Kh narrowly, sec infra notes 27 - 45 and accompanying text, some 
courts have interpreted the stalute broadly, see infra notes 46- 60 and accompanying text. 
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A. Cases Interpreting Title IX's Reach Narrowly 
The decisions construing program-specificity narrowly27 can be seen as 
reflecting the rejection of the strict institutional approach. Any broad reading 
of program-specificity is perceived as merely an attempt to evade the statute's 
express program-specific approach. 2H 
These decisions assume that "program or activity" is defined from the 
perspective of the educational institution. 211 Under this view, educational insti -
tutions consist of many "programs," such as "athletic programs," :lo "work-
study programs,'' 31 and "math department programs,''J2 which exist irrespec-
tive of the school's receipt of federal aid. Relying on this definition of 
"program or activity," these courts have held that Congress meant for title IX 
to apply only to those discrete parts of a school receiving aid, rather than to 
27 . Sec, e.g. , Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982); Rice v. l'rc'>tdent ut 
Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1981), ccrt. denied, 456 U.S . 928 (19H2); Univcr.,ity of 
Richmond v. Bell, 543 f. Supp. 321 (E .D. Va. 1982); Othcn v. Ann Arbor School Ild., 507 F. 
Supp. 1376 (E.D . Mich. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983) . 
The major proponents of this narrow interpretation have, of course, been school officiab or 
those affiliated with educational institutions. See Sex Discrimination Regulation ~ Hearing.,, supra 
note 15, at !JR- 99 (statement of John Fuzak, President, National Collegiate Athletic A'>'>nciation); 
id . at 228- 30 (>tatcmcnt of Dr. Dallin Oaks, President, Brigham Young University and Dircnor 
and Secretary of the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universi -
ties) . 
The majority of the commentators who have addrcs.,ed the issue have argued for a narrow 
reading of title IX . Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics arc Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 
65 Geo . L.J . 48,62- 64 (1976); Comment, Ultra Vires, supra note 17, at 181 - 82; Note, Title IX 
Sex Discrimination Regulations: Impact on Private Education, 65 Ky. L.J. 656, 694 (1<)77) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Title IX Impact]; Note, Title VI, Title IX, and the Private University: 
Defining "Recipient" and "Program or Part Thereof," 78 Mich. L. Rev. 608 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Title VI, Title IX). This commentary primarily addresses the question of whether 
the title IX regulations arc valid agency rulemaking to effectuate congressional intent concerning 
title IX. Published before the courts began to interpret title IX's swpc, the commentary has had 
an important impact on the analysis of several courts . Sec, e.g., Othcn v. Ann Arbor School Ild., 
507 F . Supp. 1376, 1388 (E.D . Mich . 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir . 1983). 
28. See, e.g . , Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir . 1982); University of 
Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 330(E.D. Va. 1982); Comment, Ultra Vires, supra note 17, 
at 182-84. 
29. See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 424-30 (6th Cir. 1982); Ucnnctt v. 
West Texas State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77,79 (N .D. Tex. 1981); Othcn v. Ann Arbor School Ild., 
507 F. Supp . 1376, 1382 (E. D. Mich. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). 
30. Sec Othcn v. Ann Arbor School Bd . , 507 F. Supp . 1376, 1378 (E .D. Mich . 1981), aff'd 
on other gounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir . 1983). 
31. See Rice v. President of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 33R (1st Cir . 1981), ccrt. denied, 
456 u.s. 928 (1982) . 
32. Sec Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 f.2d 418, 428 (6th Cir. 1982) . Commentators have 
come to similar conclusions concerning the definition of "program or activity." Sec, e .g., Kuhn, 
supra note 27, at 62-64; Note, Title VI, Title IX, supra note 27, at 623; Comment, Title IX of the 
1972 Education Amcndrncnts: Preventing Sex Discrimination In Public Schools, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 
103, 110 (1974) !hereinafter cited as Comment, Public Srhoob]. But cf. Note, Administrative 
Cutoff of Federal Funding Under Title VI: A Proposed Definition of "Program," 52 Ind . I..J . 
651, 669 (1977) (arguing that "program" should be given a flexible definition that depends on 
how the aid is used by the recipient). 
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the entire school.n They have applied what this Note terms the direct -fundin g 
interpretation of title IX; only those parts of a school that receive federal aid 
directly are covered by title IX's prohibition. For example, the Sixth Circuit 
recently held that although the school's receipt of student -aid funds did trigger 
title IX coverage, only the school's "student grant and loan program "" 1 was 
covered. The court stated that 
[t]here is no explicit language in Title IX which supports HEW' s 
position that an entire institution can constitute an "education pro-
gram or activity." . .. As noted by one commentator, the term 
"program" was used in the Congressional debates preceding pas-
sage of Title IX "to refer not to the total program of an educational 
institution but to smaller-scale activities within the institution." .. . 
In short, we find that the legislative history of . . . l'i t le I X 
reveal[s] no indication that Congress contemplated that an ent ire 
educational institution could constitute a single "program or activ -
ity." We further find that the position of HEW is incon s i~tent with 
the program-speci fie nature of Title I X insofar as its practical effect 
would be to circumvent the programmatic focus of the statute and 
adopt the institutional approach. :1" 
Similarly, several courts applying the direct-funding interpretation have con -
cluded that receipt of noncarmarked aid fails to trigger title IX coverage 
because it docs not constitute aid to a specific "program or activity.":l 11 
The direct-funding interpretation seems to have been derived in large part 
by equating the reach of title IX's prohibition with the scope of the Depart-
ment's authority to terminate a school's federal aid.:17 Title IX expressly limits 
33. See, e.g., Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F . Supp . 1376. 1388 (E . D. Mkh . 19tH), 
aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir . 1983). The Otilen court noted that the Senate 
originally acted on a version of title IX that was clearly institutional in scope, but later passed the 
present version of title IX . ld. at t382; sec infra note 131 and accompanying text. The court also 
noted that§ 904 of title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1684 (1976), in contrast to§ 901, contains an explicit 
institutional prohibition on admissions discrimination against the blind and vi>ually handicapped. 
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Lid., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (E .D. Mich . 19RI), aff 'd on other 
grounds, 699 f'.2d 309 (6th Cir . 19SJ). See infra notes 196- 205 and accompanying text; >~e also 
Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F .2d 418, 426- 27 (6th Cir. 1982) (conduding that intcrprctiug 
"program" as the entire school is inconsistent with congressional intent) . 
34 . Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 430 (lith Cir. 1982) . 
35 . ld. at 427; sec also University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 1:. Supp. 321, 332 -J3 (E. D. Va . 
1982) ("athletic program" received no direct federal funding but was funded, in part, from the 
general budget of the school that included federal student aid; held, title IX did not cover the 
athletic department) . The Reagan Administration's interpretation of program-specificity closely 
parallels that articulated by the Sixth Circuit in 1/i//sda/e. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, Memorandum on Program-Specificity 2 (March 15, 1983) (on file at the offices of the 
Columbia Law Review) )hereinafter cited as Memorandum). 
36. Sec University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 332 (E.D. Ya. 1982); Othen v. 
Ann Arbor Sdwollld., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (E.D. Mich . 19!!1), afT'd on other ground!., 6'J9 
F.2d J09 (6th Cir. 19R3). 
37 . The Department has relied on its uuthority to terminate a school's federal aid a' its chid 
means of enforcing wmpliancc with title IX's prohibition . Sec Comment. Ultra Vires, supra note 
17, at 178 n.210. 
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the latter by stating that "termination ... shall be limited in its effec t to the 
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so 
found." :IH This language is often referred to as the "pinpoint provision." ·''' 
Some courts have read the pinpoint provision as diclating that only those parts 
of a school whose funds can be terminated arc covered by title lX's proh ibi-
tion. 40 
Several courts have implicitly equated the reach or title IX' s prohibition 
with the scope of the pinpoint provision even when the title IX prohibition 
was being enforced by other mcans. 41 The district court decision in Otlren v. 
Ann Arbor School Board, 42 which was the first to articulate the direct -funding 
interpretation, involved a private action seeking injunctive relief under ti tl e 
IX. 4:1 The court held that sex discrimination on the golf team was not ~'it h in 
the reach of title IX because no federal funds were car111arkcd for .h ~ ;< ·<I·· ;c 
program." 44 Both the pinpoint provision and the rejection of the strict i· .t 111 
tiona! approach were invoked as reasons for concluding that " fcdl. t1 im p Jet 
[noncarmarked] aid" can never provide the basis for title IX coverage of 
athlctics. 4 " 
B. Cases Interpreting Title IX's Reach Broadly 
The two courts broadly construing the reach of program-specificity have 
based their decisions on the theory of giving "full scope ... to the non-
discriminatory purpose that Title IX was enacted to achieve. " 40 The two 
38. 20U.S .C. § 1682(1976). 
39. See Kuhn, supra note 27, at 64 . 
40. Sec Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 42R (6th Cir. 1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor 
School Bd . , 507 f'. Supp . 1376, 1382 (E . IJ . Mich . t981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th 
Cir. 1983); cf. Ferris v. University of Tex., 558 f'. Supp . 536,541 - 43 (W.IJ. Tex . 1983) (interpret -
ing the program-specific language of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). 
41. S<•e Rice v. President of Harvard College, 663 l-'.2d 336, 338 n.l (I st Cir. 11)81) (private 
action), ccrt. denied, 456 U.S . 928 (11)82); University of Rid1mond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 326 
(E .D. Va. 1982) (agency's authority to investigate); flennett v. West Tex . State lJniv., 525 F. 
Supp. 77,79- 80 (N .D. Tex. 1981) (private action); Othcn v. Ann Arbor School lid . , 507 F. Supp. 
1376, 1382 (E .D. Mich. IY81) (p1ivatc action), aff'd on other grounds, 691) F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 
1983); cf. Ferris v. University of Tex . , 558 F. Supp. 536, 541 - 43 (W.D. Tex. 11)83) (explicitly 
equating, in a private action, the program-specific reach of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 with 
the swpc of the Department's termination authority, which is limited by the pinpoint provi,ion). 
42. 507 f'. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir . 
1983) . 
43 . In the original complaint, the plaintiff also sought damages. Othcn v. Ann Arbor School 
Bd., 699 F.2d 309, 311 (6th Cir. t983). 
44. Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd . , 507 F . Supp . 1376, 1387, 1389 (E. D. Mich. 1981), aff'd 
on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). 
45 . ld . at 1382, 1384, 1387-89. 
46. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697 (3d Cir . 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 
1181 (1983) (No . 82-792);·accord id. at 694; !-Iaffer v. Temple Univ . , 524 F. Supp. 531, 538 (E. D. 
Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). Several commentators have argued that title IX 
should be interpreted to have an expansive reach. See Comment, Public Schools, supra note 32; 
Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title IX, 88 Yale 
L.J. 1254 (11)79); see also Sex Discrimination Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, at 128 
(statement of Laurie Mabry, President, Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women). 
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decisions, however, present different approaches to defining "program or 
activity." In Grove City College v. /Je/1, 17 which involved the termination of 
student aid, the Third Circuit concluded that "[w]here the federal govern ment 
furnishes ... non-earmarked [student] aid to an institution, it is apparent ... 
that the institution itself must be the 'program.' " 1R 'fhe court explicitly 
rejected the direct-funding interpretation, on which the college had relied. 1n 
Although the decision concedes that title IX's reach must be program-spc-
cific,"0 it fails to articulate a general approach to program-specificity. The 
court's analysis ignores the significance of the pinpoint provision in interpret -
ing the statutory schcme." 1 
In Haffer v. Temple University, "~ a private action und er title 1.\., the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania defined "program or 
activity" from the educational pcrspcct i vc. "'1 U nl i kc the cl i reel · fundin g ca•._,~ , 
however, it interpreted "receiving Federal financial assist,ancc" ~o as to give 
title IX a broad reach."1 The court's analysis of legislative intent conclu ded 
that title IX's prohibition extends to "programs or activities" receiving fed-
eral monies directly or indirectly. The court stated by way of exampk: 
A university ... cannot usc federal money to support one 
graduate program, such as the law school, run that program in 
perfect compliance with ... Title IX, transfer nonfcclcral money 
from the law school budget to the budget of another program, such 
as the medical school, and deny ... women admission to the medi-
cal school."" 
Thus, even though none of Temple's federal funds had been earmarked for 
athletics, 5(1 the court held that title IX prohibited sex discrimination in the 
47 . 687 F,2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S, Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. ll2-792). 
48. ld, at 700. 
49. I d. at 696-97. 
50. ld. at 697. 
51. I d. Under the Third Circuit's analysis, the court did not have to construe the cffc~t of the 
pinpoint provision . Both the noncompliance and the "program" extended throughout the entire 
school. Thus, termination had no effect outside the discriminatory part of the "program ." The 
entire "program" was not complying with title IX, because the college declined to sign an 
Assurance of Compliance. ld. at 704. In addition, the court declined to consider how "program" 
should be dcfioed in the context of earmarked funding . ld. at 698, 
52. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E .D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). The basis of the 
Third Circuit's affirmance in Huffer is not clear. The district court held that the "athletic 
program" was covered on two grounds: (I) the aid to the institution, id. at 539, and (2) the 
school's receipt of student-aid funds . ld . at 540 . The Third Circuit stated its reliance on the 
holding in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982) . The court, however, affirmed 
on both grounds. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16- 17 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, the court 
apparently expanded on the Grove City holding . 
53. Hal'fcr v. Temple Univ., 524 r . Supp. 531 , 538 (E,D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F,2d 14 (3d 
l'ir. 1982) . 
54 . ld . 
55. ld. 
56. ld. at 532. The district court found that ' Temple University rccei,ved "over nineteen 
million dollars in federal grants and contracts. In addition, it receive[d] aid in the form of long 
term loans and interest subsidies for construction and renovation of university buildings. This aid 
constitutc[dl approximately one-tenth of Temple's annual operating budget." I d. (footnote 
omitted). The university was also supported, in part, by federal student aid, ld . at 540. 
4' 
1983] REACH OF TITU:' IX !.>.I 7 
"athletic program."'7 The court's definition of "program or activity" differs 
from that of the Third Circuit in Grove City College v. Bell, in that the fo nncr 
is based on the educational perspective while the latter seems to depend on tlw 
form of the federal aid."8 Commentators have characterized the interpretation 
of title IX taken by the /-Iaffer court as the "benefit theory," arguing that the 
court read "receiving Federal financial assistance" as receiving or bcncf'iting 
from federal aid. 5u In response to the university's argument that the pinpoint 
provision was consistent with only the direct-funding interpretation, the 1/aj~ 
fer court distinguished the scope of the Department's authority to terminate 
federal aid from the reach of title IX's prohibition. 011 
None of the decisions to date provide an adequate interpretation of title 
IX's program-specificity. The difficulties stem, in part, from a failu tc to 
analyze properly the scope of the Department's termination authoriiy <tHd, i" 
particular, the limitations mandated by the pinpoint provision . No cour t ha ~. 
recognized the interpretative significance of the Department's abi li!y to en-
force title IX by "any other means authorized by law." 
I I . DISCOVERING 0TIIER - MEANS ENFORCE MEN '! 
A coherent interpretation of title IX's program-specif'ic prohibition must 
take account of the title IX enforcement scheme. As the Suprclllc Court has 
noted,'11 the reach of section 901 's prohibition must be ddermined in accord -
ance with the scope of section 902's enforcement provisions. Because the 
scope of the Department's enforcement authority influences how "program" 
should be defined, this Note examines the limitations on the scope of that 
authority before defining "program. " 112 An analysis of title I X 's en forccment 
57 . I d . at 538 . 
58 . See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying texl. 
59. See Kuhn, supra note 27, at 71; Comment, Ultra Vires, supra note 17, at 182; Note, Title 
IX Impact, supra note 27, at 686. 
University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp . 321, 330 (E. D. Va . 1982), clwracterizcd /lajfcr 
as an application of the benefit theory. The Department's regulations have been similarly charac-
terized . See id .; Comment, Ultra Vires, supra note 17, at 182- 83. Proponent s of a broad reach 
have often advanced the benefit theory as an appropriate interpretation of title IX. Note, The 
Application of Title IX to School Athletic Programs, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 222 (1983). Comment, 
Public Schools, supra note 32, at 110; Sex Discrimination Regulations Hearings, supra note 17,' at 
187- 91 (memorandum by the American Law Division) . 
Another argument used for expanding the reach of program -specificity is the so-called 
"infection theory ." First articulated in Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078 
(5th Cir. 1969) (interpreting title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), the infection theory is based 
on the proposition that titk IX's prohibition is violated where discrimination from outside the 
program "infc.:t s" the program. Sec Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983). The 
theory, however, docs not, in itself, expand the reach of title IX . If discrimination infects the 
program, the Department or the private plaintiff can investigate the program and determine 
whether title IX is being violated without an infection theory . An inference of infection, however, 
may be appropriate in ce'rtain circumstances. Sec infra notes I R 1- !!9 and accompanying texl. 
60. HalTer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 533 (E.D. Pa . 1981), aff'd, 6R8 F.2d 14 (3d 
C ir . 1982). 
61. North Haven Bel. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 536- 37 (19H2) . 
62. See infra notes t 16- 55 and accompanying text (defining "program or acJivity receiving 
Federal financial assistann:"). 
,,~-----
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scheme reveals that the prohibition can be enforced by means other than 
termination and that "program" should be defined without regard to the 
limits on the scope of termination authority. After establishing this di stinc-
tion, the Note defines "program" and then shows how title IX should be 
applied in the light of both the enforcement distinction and the "program" 
definition. 
Section 902 contemplates two distinct enforcement avenues: termination 
of federal aid and "other means authorized by law."~~'' The textual relation -
ship between the section 901 prohibition and the two enforcement provisions 
indicates that the scope of the Department's authority to terminate funds 
should be distinguished from and more limited than the scope of the Depart -
ment's ability to enforce the section 901 prohibition by other means. The 
legislative history of title IX supports this distinction. Moreove,·, th , l'u:• · 
tiona! advantages of injunctive relief over enforcement by termination o l a td 
justify allowing the former when the latter would be impossible or inqmkli· 
cal. 
A. The Enforcement Distinction 
Title IX states explicitly that the section 901 prohibition can be enforced 
by means other than termination of federal aid."• Other-means enforcement 
can take the form either of injunctions to enforce specifically the recipient's 
agreement to abide by title IX's prohibition"" or of suits under other federal, 
63. Section 902 reads in full: 
Each federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan -
cial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract 
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate 
the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by 
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent 
with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in 
connection with which the action is taken . No such rule. regulation, or order shall 
become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any 
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (I) by the termination of 
or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any 
recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity 
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or 
refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof. or other 
recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to · 
the particular progmm, or part thereof. in which such noncompliance has been so 
found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, hull'ever, That no such 
action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropri -
ate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined 
that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action 
terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply 
with a req uirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department 
or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative 
jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circum· 
stances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until 
thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report. 
20 u.s.c. § 1682 (1976). 
64 . Sec id. 
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state, or local laws to further the goals of title IX .110 The text expressly 
distinguishes the scope of termination authority from the scope of other-
means-enforcement authority. The pinpoint provision, which limits the scope 
of termination authority, is incorporated exclusively within the termination 
enforcement clause. 117 It docs not affect the scope of other-means-enforcement 
authority to effectuate the section 901 prohibition. uH 
The language of the pinpoint provision indicates that the scope of termi-
nation authority is distinct from and narrower than the scope of other-means-
enforcement authority. Termination authority is limited in that termination 
can affect only that part of a program(\\) in which discrimination is present. 711 
The scope of termination authority depends on the extent of the discrimina-
tion and the nature of the funding . Complete termination of a program's 
funding is authorized only in those instances in which discrimination pennc-
ates the program. 71 If discrimination is limited to part of a program, the entire 
program's funding cannot be terminated. In theory, the Department can 
terminate the portion of the program's funds that supports the discriminatory 
66. The Department's regulations include state and local law remedies and voluntary coutpli -
ancc under the mantle of "other means authorized by law ." 34 C .F.R. §§ IOO .H. 106.71 (19R2). 
67 . The relevant portion of section 902 reads: 
Compliance .. . may be effected (I) by the termination of or refusal to g rant or 10 
continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as 10 whom I here has 
been an express finding on the record , after opporlunity for hearing, of a failure 10 
comply with such requirement, but such lerminalion or refusal shall be limiled lo the 
parlieular polilical entity, or pari thereof, or other recipient as 10 whom such a finding 
ha;, been made , and shall be limited in its effccl 10 the partkular program, or part 
thereof, in whidt such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other meam 
authorized by law . .. . 
20 U.S .C. § 1682 (1976). 
68. There arc two general limitations on enforcement of title IX that apply both to termina-
tion and to other means. First, each agency may only enforce title IX in programs receiving 
federal aid under grant statutes administered by that agency . 20 U.S.C . § 1682 (1976); sec infra 
note 197. Second, effectuating title IX must be "consistent with achievement of the objectives of 
the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken ." 20 
U .S.C . § 1682 (1976) . For further discussion of the possible significance of this limitation, sec 
infra note 216 . 
69. This Note uses program (without quotes) to refer to its interpretation of the term 
"program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ." Sec infra note 116- 55 and accompa-
nying text. It has already been used in this way when referring to I he program-specific reach of 
title IX. 
70. 20 u.s.c. § 1682 (1976). 
71. The Department has promulgated rules to the effect that certain forms of discrimination 
affect an entire institution . Sec 34 C.F. R. § 106.21 (1982) (admissions); 34 C.F.R . § 106.23 (1982) 
(recruitment) . These rules are premised on the common sense notion that discriminatory admis-
sions and recruitment practices exclude persons "from participation in" the entire institution and, 
thereby, "from participation in" any title IX program within the institution. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 
cf supra note 5 (distinguishing between a "school" and an "institution") . 
One court has held that discrimination in admissions is not institutional in scope. Stewart v. 
New York Univ . , 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314- 15 (S .D.N.Y. 1976). Most courls , however, have 
assumed that di scriminatory admission practices have instilulional effects . Sec, e.g . , Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S . 677 (1979); Rice v. Pn:sidcnl of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 
339 n.2 (1st Cir . 19!!1), ccrl . denied, 456 U.S. 92H (1982); University of Kidunond v. Bell, 543 F. 
Supp . 321, 328 (E . D. Va. 19B2). 
'· 
'· 
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part of the program. 72 Determining that fraction of the aid and enforci ng the 
partial termination are, however, probably impossible and surely impractica F 1 
in the case of most schools, which have central budgcts .74 Other-means -
enforcement authority docs not appear to be limited to affecting only that pa rt 
of the program in which discrimination exists. The structure of section '-J02 
suggests that any discrimination in the program can be remedied by other-
means enforcement of the section 901 prohibition even if termin ation wo uld 
violate the pinpoint provision. 
The significance of the distinction between the scope of terminat ion 
authority and the scope of other-means-en forcem cnt authorit y has el uded 
courts endeavoring to interpret title IX. This omission has been paruutlarly 
notable in cases involving private actions for injunctive relief t.l! · 1 ·-~.:Lt i'H• 
901. 75 In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 70 the Supreme Coun ll.:iu dt ·, til· 
IX was meant to provide relief to individuals experiencing sex disr:r imi nat to n , 
and it found an implied private right of action ar isine: di rect! ) under the 
section 901 prohibition. 77 The courts that have applied the direct-funding 
interpretation in this context have relied in part, however, on the scope o f the 
Department's termination authority, which is specifically lim ited by the pin-
point provision, to define the reach of section 901. 78 These decisions implicitly 
rely on whether termination would be authorized to establish whether the 
discrimination is reached by title IX. 70 The enforcement distinction reveals, 
72. Such enforcement would proceed in two steps . First, the Department would have to 
determine the amount of assistance that supports the discriminatory part of the program . Second, 
the Department would terminate those funds and order the school not to allow federal funding to 
trickle bad into the discriminatory area . 
73 . Congress en visioned that this type of partial termination was practical in certain situa-
tions in enforcing titl e VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which employs the same program-
specific statutory scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); sec 110 Cong. Rc<:. 7059 (1964) ("l .cl us 
assume that in one particular State only one school di strict has been guilty of di scrimination. Aid 
would be cut off as to that one school district only. In other words, funds could not be used in 
that particular school district. However, the funds of the other school district s would not he cut 
off.") (statement of Sen. Pastore). 
74. In addition, one program's funding cannot be terminated because of discrimination in 
another program. If, for example, an institution receives funding for an experimental nursery 
school, that aiel creates one program , while funding for the theater department c' tablishc' another 
program . The nursery school program cannot be terminated because of discrimination exclusively 
in the theater department. 
75. See Rice v. President of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336 (1st Cir . 1981), ccrt. denied, 456 
U .S. 928 (1982); Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ. , 525 F. Supp . 77 (N .D. Tex. 1981); Othcn v, 
Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 f . Supp, 1376 (E. D. Mich . 1981), aff'cl on other grounds, 699 f .2cl 
309 (6th Cir. 1983). But see Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 f . Supp. 531, 533- 34 (E .D. Pa. 1981), 
aff'd, 688 F.2cl 14 (3d Cir. 1982). See generally Kuhn, supra note 27, at 64- 65; Note, Title VI, 
Title IX, supra note 27. 
76 . 441 u.s. 677 (1979). 
77. ld. at 709, 717. 
78. Sec supra notes 41 - 45 and accompanying text. 
79. In Othen v. Amf Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp . 1376, 1382 (E .D. Mich. 1981), aff'cl on 
other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983), the district court dedsion refers repeatedly to the 
pinpoint provision as evidence of the limited reach of title IX's prohibition against sex discrimina-
tion . Othen in volved a private action to remedy alleged sex discrimination on the golf team. I d. at 
1378. As is typical of these cases, the discrimination alleged was confined to a discrete part of the 
school, so tha t title IX coverage based on federal funds distributed broadly through the school 
·_. 
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however, that the scope of termination authority docs not determine the 
general program-specific reach of the prohibition. 
The Supreme Court's decision in North Haven Board of Education v. 
Be/180 should not be read as equating the scope of the Department's termina-
tion authority with the reach of title IX's prohibition. 8 1 The North Haven 
Court rejected the strict institutional approach and stressed that title IX's 
prohibition is program-specific. 82 As part of its review of the facial validity of 
the Department's title IX regulations, the Court noted that the regulations, 
and by extension the prohibition, can be no broader in ~cope than the scope of 
the Department's enforcement authority. 8:1 Although the Court was correct in 
holding that title fX's reach is program-specific and in equating the reach of 
its prohibition with the Department's enforcement authority, it would be 
inaccurate to read the Court's opinion as implying that the scope of the 
program-specific prohibition must be coterminous with the scope of rem/ina-
lion authority. The opinion fails to acknowledge mean!: of enforcement other 
than termination. The scope of other-means-enforcement authority was not 
before the Court, however; the Department sought termination of federal 
aid. 84 Moreover, the Court plainly did not want to resolve the issue of title 
IX's scope. 85 The Court's decision is not inconsistent with the existence of 
program-specific enforcement of section 901 's prohibition by other means 
where termination would violate the pinpoint provision. 
would not be amenable to termination enforcement. Termination, in the Othen context, would 
affect nondiscriminatory parts of the school and, thus, would not be within the Department's 
authority. 
80. 456 U.S . 512 (t982). 
81. I d. at 535- 36. The Second Circuit had suggested 1 hat the Department's regulatory power 
was strictly institutional in scope. North Haven Bd . of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d 
Cir. t980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). The Court disagreed with how Second Circuit distinguished 
between termination authority and regulatory authority. While the Court's language was broad : 
we find that the Court of Appeals paid insufficient attention to the "program-specific" 
nature of the statute . The court acknowledged that, under § 902, termination of fund~ 
"shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . .. 
noncompliance has been . . . found," but implied that the Department's authority lO 
issue regulations is considerably broader ... . We disagree. 
ld. at 535- 36 (citation omilled). The Court's analysis docs not foreclose this Note's distinction . 
Moreover, the Court found the regulations valid because their scope did not exceed that of 
the Department's enforcement authority. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Scwnd Circuit 
noted the existence and import of the other-means-enforcement provision. Cf. Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S . 677, 705 ( t 979) (distinguishing bet ween burden of proving discrimina-
tion when remedy is termination of funding and burden when remedy is discrete injunctive relief). 
82. 456 U.S. at 536- 37 (1982). The Court repeatedly indicated that the strict institutional 
approach is inconsistent with the program-specific reach of the stalUtc . ld. But sec Grove City 
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 61!4, 697 (3d Cir. 1982) (Norlh /Iaven "implicitly adopt[edl an institu-
tional approach to the concept of program ."), ccrt. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792). 
83. 456 U.S. at 537. The Court held that the regulations were not "inconsistent with Title 
IX's program-specific clraracter." ld . 
84. ld. at 518 . 
85. ld. at 540 ("JW)e do not undertake to define 'program' in this opinion."); sec also 
University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 326 (E .D. Va. 1982) ("The Court in North 
Haven did not resolve what is meant by Title IX's reference to the 'education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.' "). 
,, 
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B. The Legislative Hislo1y of Title IX and Title VI 
The legislative histories of title IX and title VI of the Civil Rights i\et of 
196480 reveal that Congress intended to distinguish bet ween the scope of 
termination authority and the reach of title IX's prohibition as enforced by 
other means. 87 The legislative intentions concerning the reach of title VI 
should guide the interpretation of title IX because title IX's program-specific 
language was drawn directly from title VJ.HB Moreover, Congress explicitly 
intended that the reach of title IX mirror that of title VJ.Ho 
ll6 . 42 u.s.c. ~ 2000<.1 (1976). 
87. The Department's regulations appear to incorporate thi s distinction . 1 he reg ulat i(lll' 
di stinguish the scope of the Department's authority 10 terminate fund ' from lis authority in 
regulate title IX programs. Although the regulations generally have a broad swpc , Sl'C 34 ( ·.1 .R :; 
106.11 (1982), the scope of termination authority is limited in accordance with the holdin g Pi" 
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1':169). 40 [ <" eel . Reg. 24,12H ( I'J7S); 
accord North Haven 11d. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 539 (1982). 
This Note docs not address how the questions of the scope of the regulations 'hould be 
imcrpretcd or how much judicial deference the agency interpretation should be granll:d. The 
Supreme Court in North /Iaven, 456 U.S. at 538 n .29. did not defer to the Dcpartn1ent' , 
interpretation of title IX reflected in the regulations. In any event, a review of the scope of the 
regulations must begin with an examination of the scope of the statute. But sec Note, lntelll or 
Impact : Proving Discrimination Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80 Mich. L. Rev . 
1095, 1101 - 05 (1982) (arguing that the title VI regulations arc legislative and binding on the 
reviewing court) . 
88 . Section 601 of title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), contains the same program -specific 
prohibition as § 901 of title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), except that the former prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of "race, color or national origin" while the latter prohibits sex 
discrimination . In addition, title VI applies to "any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance" while title IX is limited to "any education program or activity," and § 901 
contains several exceptions nol included in § 601. The agency rulemaking and enforcement 
authorizations, § 602 of title VI and § 902 of title IX, arc identical. In North Haven lid. of Educ. 
v. Bell, 456 U .S. 512 (1982), the Court distinguished title VI's employment coverage from that of 
title IX, but the Court's distinction was limited by its own terms . Title VI is a useful guide to 
interpreting title IX where there is no contrary suggestion in the language or the legislative history. 
I d . at 1922. Title IX and title VI are distinguishable in terms of employment coverage because title 
VI's statutory employment exemption was removed from title IX . ld . The program -specificity of 
title IX, however, is not distinguishable from that of title VI. 
Nevertheless, several courts and commentators have distinguished between the reach of title 
VI and the reach of title IX. Sec University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F . Supp. 321, 328 (E .D . Va . 
1982); Othcn v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, IJ87 (E.D. Mich. 19RI), aff'd on 
other grounds, 699 F .2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983); Note, Title IX Impact, supra note 27, at669- 7X. The 
Othen court conceded that title VI served as a model for title IX, and that judicial interpretations 
of title VI might be relevant to a determination of the breadth of title IX. It slated, however, that 
title VI cases arc different from title IX cases because courts scrutinize race classifications more 
strictly than they do sex classifications. 507 F. Supp. at 1387. This analysis has no place in the 
consideration of what Congress meant program-specificity to mean. Congress clearly had the 
power to give title IX a reach equal to that of title VI . lis intention to do so should not be stymied . 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), was 
also modeled on title VI. Just as courts are split on the interpretation of title IX's program-
specificity, they are split on how to interpret the reach of§ 504. Compare Brown v. Sibley, 650 
F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying the direct funding interpretation), and Ferris v. University of 
Tex., 558 F . Supp. 536 (W.O. Tex. 1983) (same), with Poole v. South Plainfield Bd . of Educ., 490 
F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980) (interpreting the reach of§ 504 broadly). Because of the similarity 
among§ 504, title VI, and title IX, this Note's interpretation of title IX's program-specificity can 
be carried over to an interpretation of either of the other statutes. 
89. The origins and legislative history of title IX evidence this intention . The first proposed 
sex discrimination legislation was a proposed amendment to title VI adding "sex" to the prohibi-
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The title VI legislative history suggests that Congress's fear of extensive 
termination of federal aid led to the specific limitation on the scope of 
termination authority. In the original House version of title VI the termina-
tion-enforcement provision authorized "termination of ... such program or 
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been . . . a failure to comply. " 110 
In the face of fears expressed by certain congressmen of widespread termina-
tion of federal aid1)J the sponsors of the bill stressed that other-means enforce-
ment provided an alternative to termination that allowed the agency "to avoid 
a fund cutoff if some other-means of ending discrimination [was) avail-
able."92 One of the sponsors, Senator Ribicoff, described the function of 
other-means enforcement by stating: 
It is important to emphasize ... that ["other means authorized 
by law"] has significance and meaning. Without this phrase, there 
would only be the remedy of a cutoff of funds. But the words "by 
any other means authorized by law" give flt:xibility to permit the 
agency or the department of the Government to usc alternative 
remedies, under the regulations.0:1 
lions on "race, color or national origin." Discrimination Agaimt Women: Hearings Before the 
Special Subcomm . on Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 9ht Cong., 2d Ses~. I 
(1970) . Congress passed title IX instead of amending title VI for strategic, as opposed to 
substantive, reasons. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S . 512,546- 47 (1982) (Powell, J ., 
dissenting) . The supporters of title IX feared that if title VI were opened for amendment it might 
be substantially weakened. See Sex Discrimination Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, at 409 . 
During the floor debate on title IX, the Senate sponsor, Birch Bayh, stated that: 
Central to my amendment arc sections . . . which ... prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of sex in federally funded education programs. Discrimination against the 
beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohihitcd by title VI 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition docs not apply to 
discrimination on the basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets 
forth prohibition and enforcement provisions which generally parallel the provisions of 
title VI. 
118 Cong. Rec. 5807 ( 1972). Title I X's provisions are "generally" equivalent because Congress 
did not want to prohibit single-sex undergraduate admissions. See, e.g., 20 U.S .C. § 1681(a)(5) 
(1976); 117 Cong. Rec. 39,248- 61 (1971). 
The floor debates arc the most authoritative source of congressional intent concerning title 
IX . North Haven Bd. of Educ . v. Bell, 456 U.S . 512, 526-27 (1982). 
90. 110 Cong. Rec. 7059 (1964). 
91. Sec id . at 7059, 7062, 7067. 
92. ld. at 7060. Other-means enforcement was referred to repeatedly during the debate on 
§ 602 as the preferred way to enforce§ 601. ld. at 7063 ("Section 602, by authorizing the agency 
to achieve compliance 'by any other means authorized by law,' encourages agencies to find ways 
to end discrimination without refusing or terminating assistance."); id. at 7065 (favoring "a 
provision allowing the administrator to institute a civil action to eliminate the discrimination"); 
id . at 7067 ("In most cases alternative remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimination, would 
be the preferable and more effective remedy."). 
93. ld. at 7061 . 
The principal "other means" was thought to be the enforcement of contractual obligations. 
Congress contemplated that when the Department granted federal aid it would require the 
recipient to comply with the statutory prohibition as a contractual condition of receiving the 
money. The enforcement of these obligations would constitute enforcement by "other means 
authorized by law ." Senator Ribicoff described the process as follows: 
[T]he agency could usc any of the remedies available to it by virtue of its own "rule, 
regulation, or order of general applicability." For example, the most d'fcctive way for 
an agency to proceed would often be to adopt a rule that made the nondiscrimination 
------~---------------------., ___ .. 
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Under the House version of the bill, however, Congress envisioned other-
means enforcement primarily as an alternative to termination. 114 While the 
problem of effectuating the prohibition where discrimination existed in only 
part of the program was recognized,ur. and Congress saw other-means enforce-
ment as an appropriate remedy in that context ,1111 Congress seems to have 
contemplated the possibility of termination as well.'17 Thus, termination au-
thority and other-means-enforcement authority had the same scope. Uoth 
were limited to the program in which there was discrimination. 0H 
During Senate consideration the termination provision was amended to 
include the pinpoint provision. 00 The amendment was aimed at the fear that 
extensive termination could injure many innocent beneficiaries of federal 
funds.too This specific intention to limit termination authority, however, left 
requirement part of a contractual obligation on the pan of the recipient. Then violation 
of such a requirement would normally give the agency the right to bring a lawsuit to 
enforce its own corllract; or, in the absem:c of a technical contract, the agency would 
have authority to sue to enforce compliance with its own regulations . 
let. at 7066. The Department has promulgated rules that require recipients of federal aid to sign an 
Assurance of Compliance under which the§ 901 prohibition becomes a contractual obligation of 
the recipient. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1982). 
The Department's authority to enter into such contractual obligations is not conferred by the 
phrase "other means authorized by law." Sec 110 Cong. Rec. 7060 (1964). Rather, the laws 
creating the Department and authorizing its administration of particular assistance statutes grant 
the Department the power to make contracts with the recipients of the federal aid the Department 
administers . Sec Note, Nonstatutory Executive Authority to Bring Suit, 85 llarv. 1 .. Rev. 1566, 
1567 (1972); d. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 46- 50 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2415- 19 (Additional Views of lion. George Meader) (criticizing the usc 
of "government by injunction" under title VI); id. at 85 - 86, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad . 
News at 2454 (minority report) (criticizing title VI because it authorizes enjoining discrimination) . 
94. Sec IIOCong . Rcc . 7060,7061,7063,7065,7066 (1964). 
In addition, Congress envisioned title VI coverage where termination would be impossible. 
Senator Pastore began his exposition of title VI with the example of a hospital built with federal 
aid. ld. at 7054; sec infra notes 162- 65 and accompanying text. He indicated that title VI would 
prohibit discrimination in the administration of the hospital. ld. Of course, such coverage could 
not be enforced by termination . 
95. ld. at 7060 (statement of Sen. Pastore) ("I do not know how we could particularize in a 
case like that. I realize that there is a serious problem."). 
96. ld. at 7061. In the case of a "hard core, pinpoint condition in a state" where the 
"program in the remainder of the State" was nondiscriminatory, title VI could be enforced by 
"some kind of injunctive relief .. . so as not to do an injustice to a great multitude because of the 
instance of only one offender." I d. 
97. ld. at 7060. 
98. ld. at 7063, 7066 ("The cutoff must be limited to the program or activity in which there 
was discrimination.") (statement of Sen. Ribicofl). 
99. See 110 Cong . Rec. 12,714-16 (1964). 
100. 
Some Senators have expressed the fear that in its original form title VI would 
authorize cutting off of all Federal funds going to a State for a particular program even 
though only one part of the State were [sic) guilty of racial discrimination in that 
program . And some Senators have feared that the title would authorize canceling all 
Federal assistance to a State if it were discriminating in any of the federally assisted 
programs in that Sttltc. 
As was explained a number of times ... these interpretations of title VI arc 
inaccurate .... [W)c have made [our intention) specific in the provision> of title VI by 
adding language to 602 to spell out these limitations more precisely . 
ld. at 12,714. 
Because no report on the amended version was made , congressional intent must he inferred 
from the explanations of the senators who drafted and sponsored the modifku version . 
. ~'"' 
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the original program-wide scope of other-means-enforcement authority unaf-
fected.101 The Department's authority to regulate and prohibit discrimination 
throughout the program is, thus, entirely consistent with title VI's legislative 
history. 102 
The legislative history of title IX, though sparse, 10:1 is also consistent with 
the distinction between the scope of termination authority and the scope of 
other-means-enforcement authority. Congress did not envision termination to 
be the sole means of enforcing title IX. 101 Senator Bayh's comn1cnts during 
the floor debates on an earlier version of title IX indicate that Congress 
envisioned that other-means enforcement would play a role in the statutory 
scheme. 10r. Yet the legislative history is not entirely clear; at the one point in 
the House floor debate where the question of the scope of enforcement 
authority arose, the sponsor's description was ambiguous. 1011 The title IX 
Congress failed to consider explicitly how the section 901 prohibition would 
be enforced. In light of the express congressional intention that title VI's 
enforcement scheme be copied, 107 this lack of consideration is understandable. 
101. The sponsors suggested that the pinpoint provision only codified whai the sponsors 
thought was the intent expressed by the Senate when debating the House version . I d . The pinpoint 
provision's inclusion, however, changes the scope of termination authority where discrimination 
exists in only part of a program . The scope of termination authority now depends on the extent of 
discrimination and the nature of the aid . Congress did not recognize this limitation . Compare 110 
Cong . Rec . 7059 (1964) (revealing that all funds would be cut off to a state where a state-wide 
agency discriminates even though "it might well be said that there would be an injury to many 
people"), with 110 Cong. Rec . 12,714 (1964) (the amendment guarantees that innocent beneficia-
ries will not be injured by termination). For a description of the operation of the pinpoint 
provision, sec supra notes 67 - 74 and accompanying text. 
102. Nothing was said at the amendment stage about the effect of the pinpoint provi~ion 011 
the scope of other-means-enforcement authority. 
103. See North Haven Bd . of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S . 512, 527 (1982); Othcn v. Ann Arbor 
School Bd . , 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F .2d 309 (6th 
Cir. 1983). But see Sex Discrimination Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, at 192 -96 (memoran-
dum by Center for National Policy Review). 
104. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) ("Enforcement powers include fund termination provisions 
.. . parallel to those found in title VI of the 1964 Civil Riglus Act.") (emphasis added) . 
105. 117 Cong. Rcc. 30,408 (1971) . 
106. See id. at 5807, 5808 . 
Mr. Steiger .... In title [lXI the gentleman from Louisiana asked rclaiin~ to a 
program on [sicl activities receiving Federal financial assistance . .. one wuld not · 
discriminate. That is not to be read, am I correct, that it is limited in terms of its 
application, that is, title [IXJ, to only programs that arc federally financed? For exam-
ple, are we saying that if in the English department they receive no funds from the 
Federal Government that therefore that program is exempt? 
Mrs. Greene .... If the gentleman will yield, the answer is in the affirmative. 
Enforcement is limited to each entity or institution and to each program and activity. 
Discrimination would cut off all program funds within an institution. 
Mr. Steiger .... So that the effect of title [IX) is to, in effect, go across the board 
in terms of the cutting off of funds to an institution that would discriminate, is that 
correct? · 
Mrs. Greene .. . . The purpose of title [IX) is 10 end discrimination in all in"itu-
tions of higher cducaiion, yes, across the board . . . . 
117 Cong. Rcc. 39,256 (1971); sec also Comment, Ultra Vires, snpra note 17, at 170- 72 (findint; 
this dialogue ambiguous). 
107. See 117 Cong. Rcc. 39,256 (1971); 118 Cong. Rcc . 5803, 5807- 08 (1972); supra notes 
88- 89 and accompanying text. 
(' ) () 
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The distinction as expressed in the title VI legi slative history should be read as 
the intent of the title IX Congress . 
C. The Advantages of Other-Means Enforcement 
Although the Department has not relied to date on other-means en fo rce-
men!, there are two functional rationales for its use in situations where 
termination would violate the pinpoint provision . First, while the threat of 
termination of funds may be an effective enforcement tool, the act of termina-
tion is often less effective than other-means enforcement in ending discrimina-
tion. Once a program's aid is terminated, title IX's protections no longer 
reach the program. 10~ Although termination is consistent with the legislati ve 
intention that federal aid not support discrimination, tou an inju nction would , 
in addition, further the legislative purpose of putting an end to sex di scrimina-
tion.110 
Second, injunctive relief is flexible and focused. The flexibility of the 
court's equitable powers'" allows each decree to be molded so as to prohibit 
the particular discriminatory practices, 11 2 even where those practices arc lim-
ited to a discrete component of a school such as the athletic department. 
Congress's fears of broad termination authority involved the excessive effects 
of a termination of federal funds. m Injunctive orders can be tailored and 
addressed to those who have the ability to correct the title IX violation . 114 
Injunctive relief is a precise remedy. Moreover, the prime beneficiaries of 
108. Termination merely gives a school diminished resources with which to cominue discrim-
ination. In addition, after termination no remedy is provided for those experiencing disnimina-
tion. But cf . notes 162- 65 and accompanying text (describing Congress's specific intention that 
title VI reach discrimination where termination of aid is impossible). 
109. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F . Supp . 531, 538- 39 (E.D . Pa. 1981), aiT'd, 688 F.2d 14 
(3d Cir. 1982); see also H.R . Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong. , t ; t Sess . 25 ( 1963). reprinted in 1964 U.S . 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2400 ("This title declares it to be the policy of the United States that 
discrimination ... shall not occur in connection with programs and :tctivitics receiving Federal 
financial assistance ... . "); 110 Cong. Rec. 7054- 55 (1964) ("Title VI intends to insure once and 
for all that the financial resources of the Federal Government-the common wealth of N<.:gro and 
white alike- will no longer subsidize racial discrimination .") . 
110. Sec 118 Cong. R<.:c . 5807 (1972); 117 Cong . Rcc . 39,256 (1971) ("The purpose of title 
[IX] is to end discrimination .. . . "); 110 Cong. Rcc. 7055,7059 (1964); Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U .S. 677, 704 (1979). 
Ill. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (enjoining 
institution to :tcccpt individual under title VI); Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic l.caguc, 469 
F. Supp. 659 (D. R. I. 1979) (enjoining institution either to allow plaintiff to partil'ipatc on female 
volleyball team or to set up male volleyball team). Title VI desegregation suits also provide 
examples of how injunctive relieF might be used. Sec, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Ud. 
of Educ., 372 F .2d 836, 896 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. El Camino Community College 
Dist., 454 F. Supp. 825,626 (C. D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d t258 (9th Cir. 1979); United States 
v. Tatum lndep. School Dist., 306 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Tex . 1969). 
112. "The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish . The essence of 
equity jurisdil'tion has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould cad1 decree to 
the necessities of th<.: particular case." Hecht Co . v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 121,329 (1944). 
113. See supra notes 90- 102 and accompanying text. 
114. See 0. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 12 (1978). 
~· 
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federal aid, the students, are not adversely affected by enforcement through 
injunction . 11 r. 
In sum, the term "program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance," which determines the reach of the program-specific prohibition, can be 
defined without regard to the limitations imposed on the scope of termination 
authority because Congress intended that the scope of termination authority 
be distinguished from and more limited than the scope of other-means-en-
forcement authority. That section 901 's prohibition can be enforced by other 
means even where it could not be enforced by termination is supported by the 
language of the statute, its legislative history and the functional advantages of 
other-means enforcement. 
III. THE MEANING oF PROGRAM: FocusiNG oN THE GRANT STATUTE 
This Note proposes that "program or activity nx:eiving Federal financial 
assistance" be defined as that part of the school that is supported , in part or in 
full, by aid from a particular federal grant statute. Though the results in 
several cases support this interpretation, 110 the majority of decisions concern-
ing the reach of title IX have been based on the assumption that program is 
defined purely from the educational perspective. 117 This assumption, however, 
cannot be reconciled with the language and legislative history of title IX. 
Recently, one court relied on the nature of the aid supplied by the specific 
federal grant statute to define the meaning of "program." 11 R In Grove City 
College v. Bell, 110 the Third Circuit concluded that "[w]here the federal 
government furnishes ... non-earmarked aid to an institution, it is apparent 
to us that the institution itself must be the 'program.' " 1211 Although the court 
declined to formulate a general definition, 121 the decision is consistent with 
t 15 . One commentator has argued that title IX should be interpreted in light of its cffc<.:t on 
students . Note, Title VI, Title IX, supra note 27, at 624. 
116. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. 
Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792); Board of Pub. Instruction v. finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(interpreting title VI); infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text. 
117 . See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 f .2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982); Othcn v. Ann Arbor 
School Bd., 507 F. Supp . 1376, 1378 (E. D. Mich. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th 
Cir. 1983); sec also infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. 
118. This Note uses the term "program" as short hand for "program or a<.:tivity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." Cf. supra note 69. This shorthand was used in the statute itself, see 
20 U.S.C . § 1682 (1976), and throughout the legislative history. See, e.g., 118 Cong . Rec . 5803 
(1972) (Senate floor debates); 117 Cong. Rec. 39,256 (1971) (House floor debates); 110 Cong. 
Rcc. 12,714 (1964) (title VI) . Moreover, every title IX opinion treats "program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance" as a unitary concept. Sec North Haven Bd . of Educ . v. 
Bell, 456 U .S. 512, 539- 40 (1982); Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418,427 (6th Cir. 1982). 
The words "or activity" add nothing to the statute. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 f. Supp. 
321, 327 n.IO (E. D. Va. 1982). This consensus as to the legislative intent overcomes the assump-
tion that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings . Sec Reiter v. Sonotonc 
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
119. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792) . 
120. ld . at 700. 
121. The Third Cir~uit avoided explaining how its interpretation would apply to earmarked 
or <.:atcgorical aid. ld. at 698. In addition, the dedsion <.:itcd approvingly the district court opinion 
in Haffcr v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 r .2d 14 (3d Cir. 
1982), in which the court defined "program" rrom the educational perspective. 
I i I (f 
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defining "program" as that part of a school supported by a given grant 
statute. 
The majority of the title IX decisions assume that the school's " pro-
grams" exist independently of federal aid. This assumption underlies the 
decisions' reliance on the direct-funding interpretation. Under the direct -
funding interpretation, "program" is defined from the educational perspec-
tive;122 the school is made up of a number of title IX "programs." Only those 
programs that receive funds directly are covered by title IX. Thus in Bennett 
v. West Texas Stale University, 12:1 the athletic department was called a "pro-
gram" but did not come within the reach of title IX because it did not receive 
federal funds directly.t 24 This definition of "program" is inconsistent with the 
language and legislative history of the statute. 12" 
This Note's definition of "program" rests on a more coherent int crptct<• 
tion of the language of title IX. The statute's text suggests that "progra m" 
refers both to a part of the school and to a specific grant sta tute. O n the o ne 
hand, several provisions of the statute appear to use "program" to mean a 
part of the school. For example, in one clause of section 902, "program" 
describes that part of a school to which federal aid is extcnded . 1211 On the other 
hand, several provisions appear to usc "program" to refer to a specific grant 
statute. For example, another clause of section 902 describes "termination of 
... assistance under such program." 127 And still another clause of section 902 
indicates that different congressional committees have jurisdiction over differ-
ent "prograrn[s] or activit[ies]."tZH Although the term docs present some 
122. Sec supra notes 29- 36 and accompanying tcx1. 
123 . 525 1-'. Supp. 77 (N .D. Tex . 1981). 
124. !d. at 80. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
125 . Direct-funding courts rely implicitly on the plain meaning rule. Sec Othen v. Ann Arbor 
School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E. D. Mich. 1981), afl''d on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th C'ir. 
1983) . These courts ·fail to examine the full legislative history and purpose of title IX when 
defining "program ." But sec Richards v. United States, 369 U.S . I , II ( 1962), where the Supreme 
Court noted that: 
We believe it fundamental that a sc~tion of a statute !thould not be rcitd in i!tolation from 
the context of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting 
legislation, "we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
[should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy ." 
(citations omitted) . See also Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir . 1944) (Hand, J., 
concurring) ("[T]here is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally."). 
In addition, the direct-funding interpretation cannot avoid the difficulties of determining 
what types of subunits of a school were meant to be title IX "programs." The term's common 
meaning varies. In fact, courts disagree as to the extent of "program" when defined from the 
educational perspective. Compare Rice v. President of Harvard College, 663 F .2d 336, 338 (I st 
Cir . 1981) (a law school is not a "program or activity"), ccrl. denied, 456 U.S . 928 (1982), with 
Haffer v. Temple Univ . , 524 F. Supp . 531,538 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F. 2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(using the term "law school program"). 
126. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (referring to "[cjach . . . dcpartmcut . .. which is empowered 
to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity") . In addition, § 
901(a) refers to "progrAms" as "receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(1976). 
127. 20 U.S.C . § 1682 (1976). That termination must be limited "to the particular politkal 
entity, or part thereof," id., also suggests that the direct-funding interpretation is inconsistent 
with the statutory language. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1685 (1976) (addressing "any program or 
activity under which Federal financial assistance is extended"). 
128. 20 U .S.C. § 1682 (1976). 
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ambiguity, "program" can and should be defined uniformly 1 hro ugllout the 
statute. 129 To reconcile this apparent dual use of "program," it should b:.. 
interpreted to refer to that part of a school supported by a specific L....le1 ~~­
grant statute. 
The legislative history of title IX supports this definition. The most useful 
sources for inferring the intent of the title IX Congress arc the lcgi ~bt ivc 
history of title VI, in which the program-specific statutory scheme origi-
nated, t:w and judicial interpretation of title VI prior to 1972.~:~~ 
The congressional inten tion to define "program" in terms of specific 
federal grants was explicit in the legislative history of title Vl. 1:12 In both tl 
House Report 131 and the Senate floor dcbatcs 1 :~ 1 a long list of fcdcr <~l gra.rt 
statutes was used to illustrate which "programs" would be c( "tl 1· v 
statute. 135 ln the House Report, the sectional analysis expressly ~·,. , 
eign assistance programs." 136 And in the floor debates, "program" \I<~ , r · 
peatedly used to refer to specific grant statutes.l:l7 ror c·wm 1).~, Scnal·..lr 
Humphrey described the effect of title VI on education as follows: " T it le VI 
--------------------------- - - ---
129. "There is a presumption that the same worth u' cd in dif'fer~nt part> ,d .111 ac t have :il l' 
same meaning." Fortin v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir . 1979). 
130. Sec supra notes R7 - 89 and accompanying texl. 
131. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) ("The drafters of Title 
IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted as Title VI had been during the preceding eight 
years.") . 
132. The original version of§ 601 explicitly conditioned the receipt of federal assistance on 
nondiscrimination . "Program or activity" was clearly defined in relation to the grant statute. See 
Civil Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm . on the Judiciary, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess . 730 (1963) . 
One commentator has argued that the change in statutory language from the original version 
to the present version supports the direct-funding interpretation because the change removed a 
reference to "indire<:t" financial aid from the statute. Note, Title VI, Title IX, supra note 27 , at 
614- 15. This argument fails to acknowledge that the original version referred to " direct or 
indirect" aid and that the change removed the reference to "direct" as well as that to "indit"l'ct." 
133. H.R . Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-06 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad . News 2470- 73 (minority report) . 
134. 110 Cong. Ree . 8359- 61 (1964). 
135. Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach furnished the list at the request of the 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee . For the full text of the Kaucnbach letter, sec BNA, 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 351-57 (1964). 
Congress saw title VI, through its program-specific approach, as amending every federal 
grant statute. Sec 110 Cong. Rec. 7061, 7065 ( 1964). 
Another advantage of enactment of title VI would be to remove from the area of 
legislative debate the question of nondiscrimination every time a Federal a~sistancc 
program is under consideration by Congress .... 
Title VI enables the Congress to consider the overall issue of racial discrimination 
separately from the i' sue of desirability of any particular Federal assistance program. 
The enactment of this title would avoid for the future the occasion for legislative 
dilemmas of the type described above. 
ld. at 7062. 
136. H .R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Ad. News 2400. · 
137 . Sec 110 Cong . Rcc. 7057 (describing funds distributed under various educational pro-
grams); id. at 7059 (discussing the "administration of particular assistance program"); id. at 7062 
(describing a " federal assistance program"); id. at 7065 ("Some [title VI) proposals have taken 
the form of amendments to specific bills authorizing new programs or to appropriation bills 
continuing existing programs .") . 
.  . ;. 
1230 COLUMBIA LAW RF:VIEW [Vol. 83:1210 
() 
would have a substantial and eminently desirable impact on programs of 
assistance to education." 13H And Senator Ribicoff gave the following example 
of how title VI would operate: 
The need to end discrimination in federally aided programs has long 
been recognized .... In my own experience [as Secretary of HEW] 
... I examined all of the programs within my jurisdiction to Sl.!e 
whether discriminations were occurring and what could be done to 
eliminate them .... For example, I ruled that summer teacher 
training institutes financed under the National Defense Education 
Act would not be located at any college or university that declined to 
operate such institutes without discrimination. 131J 
Senator Ribicoff's description illustrates why "program" should be defined as 
that part of the school supported by a specific grant statute. "Program" nHt~.t 
be defined in relation to the grant statute. It cannot, however, refer simply to 
the grant statute. The term must refer to the recipient of the grant as well. Ho 
Congress intended to end discrimination at the recipient's level, not at the 
agency administration level. 141 
This definition is supported most strongly by the Fifth Circuit's analysis 
of program-specificity in Board of Public Instruction v. Finch .142 In Finch, 
where the Department defended its decision to terminate all federal aid to the 
Taylor County School District, the Department argued that "the term pro-
gram in the statute does not refer to the individual grant statutes, but to 
general categories such as road programs and school programs." 143 The court 
rejected this argument and held that "program" must be defined with refer-
ence to the grant statute. 144 The court based its interpretation on the legislative 
history and purpose of title Vl. 145 Its conclusion was that "[t]itle VI cutoff is 
best effectuated by separate consideration of the use or intended use of federal 
funds under each grant statute." 1411 
This Note's reliance on Finch is appropriate. Finch was the only circuit 
court decision defining "program" prior to the .enactment of title IX. It was 
138. ItO Cong. Rec. 6545 (1964); accord id. at 6543, 6544. 
139. ld. at 7065 (emphasis added). 
140. The statutory language does not accommodate defining "program" as the grant statute 
itself. A person cannot "be excluded" from a grant statute. See 42 U.S.C. * 2000d (1976); 20 
U.S.C. § 168t(a) (1976). 
141. See ItO Cong. Rec. 6544-45 (1964); see also Soberal-Perez v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 
1164, 1171 - 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that social security disability payments do not trigger 
title VI coverage since the only possible discrimination is at the level of federal administration). 
142. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). 
143. ld. at 1076. 
144. Id. at 1077-78. 
Several commentators have argued that the Fifth Circuit's earlier decision, Bossier Parish 
School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), indicates that "program or activity" should 
refer to the entire school.' See id. at 858; Sex Discrimination Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, 
at 170 (statement of Sen. Bayh). The Fifth Circuit's analysis of program-specificity in Bossier 
Parish was, however, summary. In addition, the alleged discrimination was institutional, and thus 
violated title VI no matter what the scope of the program. 
145. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2cl 1068, 1077- 78 (5th Cir. 1969). 
146. ld. at 1078. 
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the most authoritative judicial interpretation of program-specificity at the 
time of title IX's enactment. Though Finch was not mentioned by n:-t ll1C 
during the floor debates on title I X, the legislative history reveals an awarL n ~s s 
of judicial interpretations of title Vl. 147 In addition, Senator Bayh stated 
during the hearings on the Department's title IX regulations that Finch was 
the most important guide to congressional intent concerning the reach of 
program-specificity .14R Even if the title IX legislative history fails to prove that 
Congress specifically intended to codify the Finch holding, that intention 
should be presumed. 14° Congress's intention that title IX function like title VI 
means that Congress intended "program" to be defined as it is in Finch and 
this Note. 
While courts and commentators acknowledge that Finch is an ::wtillnita-
tive interpretation of program-specificity, 150 few have followed its ba:,ic ... · :l)' 
sis. Many of the direct-funding decisions discuss the case but fail to pcrcdv~: 
that the Finch holding requires abandoning the assumption that " pru1£r:un " : .; 
defined from the educational perspective. 151 
The contemporaneous legislative history of title IX is scant 1"2 yet consist-
ent with this Note's interpretation of "program." During th <.> floor debates 
the term was used to refer both to parts of the school 1":1 and to grant stat-
utes.154 Commentators have described the legislative history as ambiguous.'"" 
147. Sec 118 Cong. Rcc. 5R07 (1972). 
148. Sex Discrimination Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, at 170 (statement of Sen. 
Bay h). 
149. Sec Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 & n.l9 (1979). 
150. Sec, e.g., North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 538, 539 & n.JO (1982); 
Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418,427 (6th Cir. 1982); Bennelt v. West Tex. State Univ., 
525 F. Supp. 77, SO n.l (N.D. Tex. 1981); Othcn v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 
1388 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983); Kuhn, supra note 
27, at 67-69; Comment, Ultra Vires, supra note 17, at 172. 
151. See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. 1-lEW, 696 f.2cl418, 427 (6th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that 
Finch equated "program" with "Federal grant statute," but failing to follow the Finch holding). 
Sec also Bennet! v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80 n.l (N.D. Tex. 1981) (relying on 
Finch as authority for the direct-funding interpretation but defining "program" from the educa-
tional perspective); cf. Haffcr v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531,538 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 
F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) (using Finch as support for interpreting program-specificity broadly). 
Several title IX decisions have distinguished Finch. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. 
Supp. 321, 330 (E.D. Va. 1982) (title IX scope not equivalent to title VI scope); Grove City 
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 698 n.23 (3d Cir. 1982) (in a case involving student aid, court 
concluded that Finch spoke only to coverage on the basis of earmarked grants), cerl. granted, 103 
S. Ct. 1181 ( 1983) (No. 82-792). 
152. See supra note 103. 
153. See 117 Cong. Rcc. 39,256 (1971). 
154. See id. 
155. See, e.g., Conimcnt, Ultra Vires, supra note 17, at 170. Some portions of the legislative 
history arc plainly ambiguous. Sec 110 Cong. Rcc. 39,256 (1971) (''Docs this title say anything 
more than . .. if a program is financed in part or in whole by a Federal program that in 
administering this particular program they cannot clis.:riminate because of sex?"). Much of the 
legislative history contains only reiterations of the statutory language. Sec, e.g., 118 Cong. Rcc. 
5807 (1972); S. Rep. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Scss. 221 (1972) . 
,; 
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The ambiguity makes it especially necessary to rely on the title VI legi slative 
history and Finch to infer congressional intent. 
A coherent definition of "program" must take into account bot h the 
recipient of the aid and the grant statute under which the aid is extended . The 
title IX statutory language and legislative history require defining "program" 
as that part of a school supported, in part or in full, by the funds of a specific 
grant statute. The remaining question in interpreting program-specificity is 
determining the scope of the programs established by each of the various types 
of federal aid. 
IV. EFFECTUATING TITLE IX: APPLYING THE PROGRAM D FFINJT!ON 
When the language and legislative history of title IX ar~ interpreted 
correctly the scope of each program depends on the nature of the federal aic' 
supporting the program. This Part analyzes how this interpretation of pro·· 
gram-specificity should be applied to each of three basic types of federal aid: 
categorical aid, nonearmarked aid, and student aid. 
A. Categorical Grant Programs 
The scope of the program created by receipt of a categorical grant must 
always be at least as broad as the funding focus of the grant statutc. 1" 11 Most 
categorical aid, however, is funnelled through a school's central budget. 1" 7 
Although many categorical grant statutes 1" H require the recipient school to 
assure the Department that the aid will supplement and not supplant the 
recipient's existing funds in the area of the grant's focus, 1r.o this budgetary 
scheme often allows the school to free up funds to support other parts of the 
156. See University of Rkhmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Ya . 1982); Haffer v . 
Temple Univ., 524 f . Supp . 531 (E.D. Pa . 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982); infra notes 
174- 80 and accompanying text. 
157. See Finn, Federal Patronage of the Universities: A Rose by Many Other Names?, in The 
University and the State II, 33 (1978). 
158. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1134n (Supp. V 1981) (law school clinical experience programs); 20 
U.S .C. §§ 1121-1127 (Supp. V 1981) (international education programs). Many grants to elemen-
tary and secondary schools now take the form of block grants. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 3801 - 3876 (Supp , 
V 1981). It is unclear whether these block grants should be interpreted as categoricaL 
Many categorical grants include expenses for overhead costs. Sec, e.g. , 20 U.S .C. § 
1122(a)(2) (Supp. Y 1981 ). These overhead funds should be viewed as earmarked rather than 
nonearmarked aid. 
159. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1029(b) (Supp. V 1981) ("A grant under this part may be made 
only if the application provides ... (2) satisfactory assurance that the applicant will expend, for 
all library material expenditures (exclusive of construction) during the fiscal year for which the 
grant is sought, from fUiids other than funds received under this part, an amount not less than the 
average annual aggregate amount ... it expended for such purposes during the two fiscal years 
preceding the fiscal year for which assistance is sought under this part."); cL 20 U.S.C. § 1134n 
(Supp. V 1981) (des.:ribing pcrmissable uses of the aid while not conditioning grant on assurance 
regarding usc); sec also University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp . 321, 323 11. 1 (E. D. Ya. 19!:!2) 
(noting the limitation on the usc of a College Library Resour.:cs grant). 
·• 
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school. wo The scope of the grant's actual support, thus, may be broader than 
the scope of the grant's nominal focus. The former should determine the 
scope of the title IX program. The program should consist of that portion of 
the school that, in fact, finds itself with increased funding by virtue of the 
school's receipt of the grant. 1111 
The legislative history of title IX and title VI, as well as the postenact-
ment history of title IX, justify this actual-support standard. Though the title 
IX Congress failed to describe expressly the reach of program-specificity, 1112 
the title VI Congress plainly intended that title VI coverage not be limited to 
the focus of the grant statute alone. Senator Pastore, one of the sponsors of 
title VI, illustrated the reach of title VI's prohibition with the example of a 
hospital, built with federal aid, that did not admit blacks. 1e3 The focus of the 
grant statute was the construction of the hospital, not its administration. 
Nevertheless, Congress intended that such a hospital could not discriminate as 
to whom it admitted-the prohibition covered the hospital's administration. 
The basis for such coverage must be that aid for construction actually sup-
ports the administration of a hospital. 1u4 
Effectuating the purposes of title IX demands the application of the 
actual-support standard. 16,., Congress clearly intended to end federal subsidiza-
tion of discrimination. 160 To realize this goal, the program that a given grant 
creates must extend to all parts of the school with increased funding by virtue 
of the grant, regardless of the grant's categorical focus. If, for example, a 
school receives a categorical vocational education grant that frees up funds for 
the science department, the grant supports the science department. The con-
160. See Finn, supra note 157, at 33 (Schools frequently "take advantage of federal funds 
earmarked for specific purposes to free non-federal aid for other purposes ."); Sex Discrimination 
Regulations Hearings, supra note 17, at 171. 
161. Actual support may, in limited circumstances, cover parts of the school that do not 
receive increased funding by virtue of a federal grant. Those parts of an institution that could not 
exist but for that portion of the school receiving increased funding by virtue of the federal aid arc 
"supported" by federal aid . For example, assume that all parts of a school receive increased 
funding by virtue of a federal grant, except the athletic department which runs on a separate 
budget. Under the actual -support standard the athletic department is part of the program. It is 
actually supported by federal aid; the department could not exist without the rest of the school. 
See Wort v. Vierling, No. 82-3169, slip op. at 4 (E .D. Ill. May 28, 1982). Support, however, 
should not be read to include other nonfinancial benefits. See infra note 175. 
162. The title IX Congress may not have seen any need to describe program-specificity since 
it intended the statute to function just as title VI had. Sec supra notes 103- 05 & 152- 55 and 
accompanying text. 
163. Sec 110 Cong. Rec. 7054-55 (1964). 
164. The example illustrates both financial support through increased funding for adminis-
tration by virtue of the construction grant, and nonfinancial support in that administration of the 
hospital was dependent on its construction. Sec supra note 161. Under this Note's interpretation 
of program-specificity, ·a construction-aid program covers, at least, the school's usc of the 
building. See Memorandum supra note 35, at 4. 
165. Courts must interpret a statute so as to give effect to its purpose . See United States. v. 
Whit ridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J .) ("the general purpose is a more important aid to 
the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may l::ty down") . 
166. Cannon v. University of Chicrrgo, 441 U.S . 677, 704 & 11.J6 (1979) . 
'· 
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gressional intention not to support discrimination dictates that title IX's 
prohibition cover the science department. Title IX's second purpose, the 
broad and comprehensive 167 elimination of sex discrimination, 1" 8 is entirely 
consistent with the actual-support standard. 
Although postenactment history cannot be accorded the interpretative 
weight of contemporaneous legislative history, title IX's postenactment devel-
opment supports the actual-support standard. 1110 In 1976, Congress amended 
section 901 and specifically exempted social fraternities and sororities from 
title IX coverage. 170 These parts of the school typically are not the focus of 
categorical grants. Yet these organizations often receive support from the 
school's general budget, which includes federal funds . The sponsors of the 
amendment argued that fraternities were never specifically intended to be 
covered by title IX. 171 The specific nature of their amendment, which did not 
purport to overturn the actual-support standard then applied by the Depart -
ment, 172 suggests that Congress contemplated title IX coverage extending to 
parts of the school on which no categorical grant focuses . m 
The practical scope of the actual-support standard depends on whether 
the Department or the private plaintiff can prove that support extends beyond 
the focus of the grant. 174 The extent of the school actually supported by a 
167. 118 Cong . Rec . 5803 (1972); accord Haffcr v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp . 531, 541 
(E. D. Pa . 1981) (concluding that "[l]ogic supports a broad reading of title IX"), aff'd, 688 F.2d 
14 (3d Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ ., 372 F.2d 836, 852 (5th 
Cir. 1966) ("We read Title VI as a congressional mandate for change."); H . R. Rep . No. 914, 88th 
Cong., 1st Scss . 85- 86 (I963), reprinted in 1964 U.S . Code Cong . & Ad . News 2391, 2453 - 55 
(minority report stressing the breadth of title VI); 110 Cong., Rcc. 5251 (1964) (opponents of title 
VI acknowledging its broad coverage). 
168. See 118 Cong . Rec . 5806- 07 (1972) ("[Title IX) is designed to expand some of our basic 
civil rights and labor laws to prohibit the discrimination against women which has been so 
thoroughly documented ."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess . 25 ( 1963), reprinted 
in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2400; 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (1964) ("The purpose of title VI 
is not to cut off funds, but to end racial discrimination ."). 
169. In both cases in which the Supreme Court has interpreted title IX, the Court has relied 
in part on the postcnactment history. See North Haven Bd. of Ednc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 
(1982) ("Where 'an agency's statutory construction has been "fully brought to the attention of 
the public and the Congress," and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it 
has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly 
discerned.'" (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.IO (1979)); Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686 n.7, 702- 03 (1979); see also Comment, Ultra Vires, 
supra note 17, at 153- 55 (discussing the interpretative significance of legislative review of agency 
rulemaking) . Compare Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F .2d 684, 693 -95 (3d Cir. 1982) (relying on 
postenactment history to determine whether student aid triggers title IX coverage), ccrt. granted, 
103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792), with Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 426- 27, 429 
(6th Cir. 1982) (eschewing reliance on the postenactment history). 
170. Pub . L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S .C. § 1681(a)(6) 
(1976)). 
171. 120Cong. Rec. 36,165 (1974). 
172. 1d . 
173. Like fraternities, intercollegiate athletics do not receive earmarked federal funds, yet 
under this Note's interpretation they could be covered by title IX . See Sex Discrimination 
Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, al 175 (statement of Sen. Bayh); supra note 161. 
174. Thi' Note uses the term "focus of the grant" 10 refer to thai portion of the school on 
which the grant statute explicitly authorizes expenditure . Sec, e.g . , 20 l! .S .C . ~ 1134n(h) (Snpp. V 
1981) . 
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given categorical grant may be difficult to establish. The reach of a program 
may be as limited as title IX's reach under the direct-funding interpretation 
when the grant supports only that part of the school on which it focuses, as 
extensive as title IX's reach under the strict institutional approach when the 
grant frees up funds that support the entire school, m or somewhere in be-
tween. The process of determining the contours of a given program proceeds 
in two stages. First, the program covers at least that portion of the school on 
which the grant focuses. 176 For example, in University of Richmond v. Bell, 177 
the school received College Library Resources grants; therefore, title IX pro-
hibited discrimination in the library. 176 The second stage involves extending 
the program beyond the focus of the categorical grant. The Department 170 or 
the private plaintiff must have the opportunity to prove that the categorical 
grant actually supports the discriminatory part of the schooJ. 1Ro 
175 . The actual-support standard reflects only financial support. It docs not extend the scope 
of a title IX program on the basis of nonfinancial benefits. That is to say, a grant to the chemistry 
department docs not create a school-wide program merely because the entire ., chool is benefitted 
by having a better chemistry department. Under such a non-financial -benefits standard the 
program always would be the entire institution. Moreover, the statutory scheme makes no sense if 
nonfinancial benefits arc recognized . Termination would never be allowed unle's the discrimina-
tion permeated the entire school. The pinpoint provision requires that the effect of termination be 
limited to the di;criminatory part of the program, see 20 U.S.C . § 1682 (1976) , and termination 
will always have nonfinancial effects throughout the school. 
176. Even if the federal funds arc spent on only a small part of the focu> of the grant, the 
federal aid mw.t be understood to support the entire area of the grant's focus . Were title IX to 
cover only part of the focus of the grant, the school would be free to dJannel federal funds so as 
to insulate discrimination from federal aid . See Cirovc City College v. Bell, 687 F.2LI 684, 706 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (Becker, J . concurring), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No . 82-792). 
177 . 543 F. Supp . 321 (E.D. Va . 1982). 
178. See id . at 332. 
179. The Department's investigatory authority must extend to the school's budget. See 
Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542, 558-59 (D. Md . 1976) (title VI case), aff'd by an equally 
divided court sub . nom. Mayor of Baltimore v. Matthews, 571 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1978) (en 
bane). The court in University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E .D. Va. 1982), rejected 
the Department's argument that it had school-wide investigatory power regardless of what aid the 
school received . The court relied in part on the absence of a regulation authorizing the investiga-
tion. Jd. at 332 & n.l5. The title IX regulations, 34 C.F.R . § 106.71 (1982), in fact, incorporate 
the title VI regulations concerning investigatory authority that allow investigation of any "possi-
ble failure to comply with [the regulations]." 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) (1982). It is clear that under 
these regulations the Department has the authority to investigate the institution's budget and to 
investigate whether alleged discrimination reaches into the title IX program. The court conceded 
that the Department did have the investigatory authority to determine the extent of the school 
actually supported by a given grant. Jd. at 331 -- 32 & n. l4. The court's concession is consistent 
with the regulations. 
180. Though the Department presumably has the ability and the expertise to investigate the 
school's usc of a given grant's funds, the private plaintiff may find such investigation difficult and 
costly . In light of Congress's intention to "provide individual citizens effective protection against 
[discriminatory] practices," Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979), the 
courts, in appropriate circumstances, might place on the school the burden of proving that the 
alleged discrimination is 'not supported by federal aid. The private plaintiff would still have to 
show that the grant funds went into the school's general hudget and that the focus of' the grant 
had been funded by the school prior to its receipt of' the grant. 
This presumption shifts the burden outo the school, which has exclusive knowledge of' its 
budgetary allocations, to prove that the grant doc' not support the allt:ged discrimination . This 
type of court -made presumpl ion has precedents in civil rights law. Sec Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
' .. 
'·' 
1236 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1210 
0 
In addition, courts should recognize two variations of the infection the-
ory.181 The theory is based on the notion that there may be discriminatory 
effects outside of the part of a school in which an alleged discriminatory act 
takes place. 182 It may be difficult and costly, however, to determine whether 
the alleged discrimination has infected a title IX program merely by investigat-
ing the program itself. 183 lnfection should be recognized in two contexts. First, 
discrimination found by the Department to have an institution-wide effect 1"4 
infects any program within the institution. If this type of discrimination 
occurs outside of one of the school's title IX programs, the court should 
conclude that the discrimination is prohibited by title IX. For example, the 
Department has found that admissions discrimination has institution-wide 
effects. 185 If admissions discrimination exists and the school administers any 
title IX program, the discrimination violates title IX's prohibition. 
Second, courts should permit private plaintiffs and the Department to 
prove infection circumstantially. Consider two examples. The school honor 
society includes only men, but the only federal aid the school receives supports 
an international studies program. 186 A court could infer that the honor society 
discrimination causes discrimination within the title IX program; the women 
cannot participate equally in the international studies program because every-
one perceives that the academic achievements of men arc more significant 
than those of women. Similarly, a math department gives men preferential 
treatment, but the only federal aid the school receives is a categorical research 
grant to the physics department. A court could infer that the access discrimi-
nation in the math department infects the title IX program. One's math 
training affects one's participation in physics. The women, in this example, 
401 U.S . 424 ( 1971) (originating the disparate-impact presumption of discrimination under title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
These difficulties will be rare in the context of higher education if the courts find that student 
aid creates a title IX program that covers the entire school. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 
F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), ccrt. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No . 82-792); infra notes 206- 27 and 
accompanying text. The vast majority of colleges will be covered by title IX's prohibition on the 
basis of student-aid support . See Finn, supra note 157, nt 22. 
181. Sec supra note 59. 
182. Courts and commentators trace the origin of the infection theory to Board of Pub. 
Instruction v. finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum) (termination of federal aid 
appropriate where title VI program is administered in a "discriminatory environment") . Sec also 
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 540 (1982) (describing the infection theory as 
consistent with program-specificity). 
183. It may be appropriate to distinguish between the Department's ability to investigate 
di scriminatory effects within the program itself, sec, e.g., University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. 
Supp . 321, 330 (E.D. Va. 1982), and the more limited ability of the private plaintiff. Sec supra 
note 180. 
184. Sec supra note 71. 
185. Sec 34 C.F.R. ~ 106.23 (1982). 
186. See 20 U .S.C. §§ 1121-27 (Supp. V 1981). This example assumes that the participants in 
the international studies grant program usc the libraries. 
JR7. Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2tl 549, 561 (5th Cir. 1983) (relying on the 
infection theo1 y to hold that where a school's foremost honor sodety discriminates on the basi-; of 
sex the entire school is di~criminatory and that terminal ion is appropriate regardless of how 
program-specificity is interpreted). 
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have been disadvantaged in the physics department. Just as in the previous 
example, the women are "subjected to discrimination under" the program; 
they are "denied the benefits" 188 of the title IX program because of discrimi-
natory acts outside the program. The school, of course, could rebut the 
inference by showing that there was, in fact, no discrimination in the pro-
gram.'Ro 
B. Nonearmarked-Aid Programs 
Under this Note's interpretation of program-specificity, a nonearmarked 
grant 1110 creates a program covering the entire school, because the focus of the 
grant is the entire school. 101 This result is consistent with the legislative history 
and language of title IX. The majority of the decisions interpreting program-
specificity hold, however, that title IX can never apply to the entire school. 11 ' 2 
The legislative history indicates that Congrc~s intended that no near-
marked aid trigger title IX coverage. It is clear that Congress intended impact 
aid, the only form of nonearmarked aid to education in 1964, to trigger title 
VI coverage. Impact aid, which is furnished to schools whose budgets are 
sapped by federal activities, includes no spending restrictions and supports the 
entire school. Senator Humphrey stated that "[t]itle VI would require elimina-
tion of racial discrimination ... in all 'impacted area' schools receiving 
Federal [impact aid] grants ." w:~ The title IX legislative history is consistent 
with this interpretation. In addition, the legislative purpose of ending federal 
support of discrimination 194 demands that nonearmarked aid trigger title IX 
188. 20 U.S .C. § 168l(a) (1976) . 
In addition, an inference of infection might be made where the same administrator oversees 
both the title IX program and the part of the school in which the discriminatory act takes place. 
For example, assume that a plaintiff shows that the chairman of a high school ~dcnce department 
discriminales against women in his chemistry class, but the only aid the school receives is a 
categorical grant to physics education. The court could infer that the same administrator di scrimi-
nates in his physics class. This argument, by extension, allows the private plaintiff to show 
discrimination circumstantially in a title IX program when the alleged discrimination is main -
tained on the basis of school policy. Cf. supra note 180 (noting that expanding the scope of a 
categorical grant program is unnecessary if the entire school is covered by title IX's prohibition on 
the basis of its receipt of student aid). 
189. See Board of Pub . Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078- 79 (5th Cir . 1969) 
(assuming that infection would not be unusual). 
190. E.g., 20 U.S.C . §§ 237- 241 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (impact aid 10 elementary and 
secondary schools); 20 U .S.C. §§ 1051. 1057- 1069(c) (Supp. V 1981) (grants to strengthen 
developing institutions). 
191. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
192. See, e.g., Bennett v. West Tex . State Univ., 525 F. Supp . 77,81 (N.D. Tex . 1981) (The 
entire school cannot be covered by title IX because, otherwise, "the programmatic construction 
of Title IX would be rendered nugatory."). 
193 . 110 Cong. Rcc . 6545 (11.)64); accord id . at 6543, 7064; H.R . Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong . , 
1st Scss. 84 (1963), reprinted in 11.)64 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2471. 
194. Sec supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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coverage. Nonearmarked aid may support discrimination unless title IX pro-
hibits discrimination throughout the school. 10" 
The direct-funding decisions 1011 basically rely on two arguments to con-
clude that title IX is not triggered when a ~chool receives noncarmarkcd aid. 
Neither of the arguments contradicts this Note's interpretation of program-
specificity. First, the direct-funding decisions hold that title IX's language 
conflicts with any interpretation in which "program" refers to the entire 
school. 107 "Program" is assumed to have a plain meaning; it refers to parts of 
a school rather than the entire school. 111x In other words, "program" is 
assumed to be defined from the educational perspective. As noted above, this 
assumption should be discarded in light of an analysis of title IX's legislative 
history and statutory language. 100 Without this assumption, the semantic 
barriers to defining "program" as the entire school disappear . 
The second direct-funding argument is that rejection of the strict institu-
tional approach requires that "program" can never ref~:r to the entire school. 
This argument stands on three legs. First, the decisions note that in two title 
195. In Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1389- 90 (E .D. Mich . 1981), 
aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983), the district court relied, in pan, on the "de 
minimis" nature of the federal impact aid to hold that the school board's receipt of that aid failed 
to invoke title IX's prohibition . Sec also Kuhn, supra note 27, at 71 - 72 . 
The amount of federal aid received, however, should not determine whether title IX's 
prohibition applies; the aid still supports the program. The nature of the aid defines the reach of 
the prograrn-spcdfic prohibition, and the scope of the discrimination determines whether termi -
nation is authorized . If the school thinks the aid is, in fact, de minimis, the school need not accept 
it. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 698 (3d Cir . 1982) (noting the logical inconsist -
ency of the argument that the more general the scope and purpose of the grant, the more 
restrictive the coverage of title IX), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792) . 
196. Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D . Tex. 1981); Othcn v. Ann 
Arbor School Bd., 507 F . Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F .2d 309 
(6th Cir. 1983). 
197. See Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (E. D. Mich. 1981), aff'd 
on other grounds, 699 F .2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). 
Courts pointing to the term "program" as self-limiting cite both the program-specific 
language of§ 901 itself and the rulcmaking clause in § 902. See id. at 1382. Section 902 provides, 
in pan, that: 
Each Federal department ... which is empowered to extend Federal financial 
assistance to any education program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or 
activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders . . .. 
20 U.S.C . § 16R2 (1976) . 
The provision does confirm that the Department's regulatory power is program-specific, but 
it fails to support the direct-funding interpretation. When "program" is defined as that part of a 
school actually supported by a specific grant statute, this provision dictates that each agency is 
authorized to regulate a program only when it administers the program's grant statute. For 
example, the Dcpartmeni of Education cannot regulate a program defined by a HUD grant. This 
interpretation gives more sense to the language. Moreover, the lcgi~lative hi~tory of title VI reveals 
that Congress specifically intended to restrict agency power in this way. H.R. Rep . No . 914, !ll!th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad . Nrws 2401. 
198. Sec supra notes 29- 32 & 122 and accompanying text. 
199. Sec supra notes 125- 55 and accompanying text. 
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IX provisions Congress used the term "institution. " 200 The courts condude 
that when Congress meant to refer to an entire school, it did so dircctly. 2" 1 
Second, the courts usc the 1971-1972 change in the Senate version of title IX 
from the strict institutional approach of 197 !2°2 to program-specificity in 1972 
to show that Congress intended to limit the reach of title IX so that the entire 
school could never be a program. 20:1 Third, North Haven is read as diet at ing 
200. 20 U .S.C. §§ 16RI(c), 1684 (1976). Section 901(c) defines the term "institulion" 10 
clarify the score of several of the § 901 cxcmrtions from Iitie IX coverage. such :1'• ~in gk s<:x 
colleges . Section 901(c) stales that : 
For rurposes of this charier an educational institution mean~ any public or pt i1a 1e 
preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any instilution of vocalion al. pro'cs-
sional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational imlitut ion com-
posed of more than one school, college, or deparlmcnt whi.:h arc adminislrati vcly 
separate unils, such term means each such school, college, 01 dPpartmcnl 
20 U.S.C . § 1681(c) (1976). 
Section 904 prohibits admissions discrimination on the basis of blindness in any imtitution 
receiving federal aid . It states that: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of blindness or severely 
impaired vision, be denied admission in any course of study by a recipient of Federal 
financial a;sistancc for any education program or :~~:tivity, bu1 nolhing hc•rein shall be 
construed to require any such institution to provide any special services 10 such person 
because of his blindness or visual impairment. 
20 u.s.c. § 1684 (1976). 
201. One coun, after quoting § 901(c), concluded that: 
Tllll~. according to the plain meaning of the slatute, llhc schooll is an educational 
institulion under Title IX. The precision with which Congress defined educational 
institution strongly indicates that it did not equate education program wilh cducalional 
institution. It obviously recognized that an educational institution offers a number of 
education programs and activities. In light of [section 901(c)l. lhe only meaningful 
interpretation of !section 901(a)l is that it prohibils sex discriminalion in a federally 
funded education program offered by an educational institution . 
Rice v. President of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338 (1st Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); accord Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bel., 507 f . Supp. 1376, 1382 
(E .D. Mich . 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). 
Neither § 901(c) nor § 904 "recognizes" that "program" i~ defined from the cducalional 
perspective. Each section's use of "institution" is consistent with a definition of "program" 
dependent on the scope of a grant's support. 
202. The original version of title IX provided: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of or be subject to discrimination under any program or 
activity conducted by a public institution ... which is a recipient of Federal financial 
assistance for any education program or activity. 
117 Cong. Rec. 30,156 (1971). 
203. See, e.g . , Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1981), 
aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983); Kuhn, supra note 27, at 64-65. 
An analysis of the legislative history reveals that this change was not intended as a specific 
limitation on the reach of title IX. The first Senate version of title IX was ruled nongcrmanc to the 
legislation to which it was appended plainly because it would have prohibited single-sex colleges . 
117 Cong. Rec. 30,4 t 5 (1971 ). At the end of 1971, in the House, similar legislation containing a 
version of title IX with the present language passed. 117 Cong. Rcc. 39,256 (1971). Soon 
thereafter, a Senate versiun of title IX was introduced with the House program-specific language. 
The sponsor of both Senate versions characterized the 1971 version as "only adding the 3-lctter 
word 'sex' to existing law." 117 Cong. Rec. 30,408 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). l"he 1972 
version did so in fact by copying title VI's language. Sec 118 Cong. Rcc . 5807 (1972). Moreover, 
when explaining the changes in language, the sponsor never mentioned the ~tatute's rcad1. 117 
Cong. Rcr. 43,081 (1971) . 
,, 
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that "program" never refer to the entire school because the Court in that case 
rejected the strict institutional approach. 20~ None of this evidence contradicts 
this Note's interpretation of program-specificity; the interpretation recognizes 
and incorporates the argument's restrictions. 20" The argument is in no way 
inconsistent with an interpretation in which "program" may or may not refer 
to the entire school depending on the scope of a given grant's actual support. 
Congress and the Supreme Court have rejected an approach under which 
"program" always refers to the entire school; they have by no means dictated 
that "program" can never refer to an entire school where it is appropriate to 
do so. 
C. Student-Aid Programs 
Determining how title IX should be applied when a school's studento 
receive federal aid206 raises two questions. The first question is whether stu-
dent-aid funds are federal financial assistance received by a title IX pro-
gram.207 The second question, if Congress did intend student aid to trigger 
title IX coverage, concerns the scope of the program created by the school's 
receipt of student-aid funds. 
The legislative history of title IX shows that Congress intended a school's 
receipt of student-aid funds to lead to title IX coverage. The drafters of title 
VI plainly envisioned that the receipt of student-aid funds would create a 
program. Student fellowships and loans were included in the list of programs 
cited both in the House report208 and in the Senate floor debates. 209 The title 
VI sponsors used student aid2t0 as an example of the type of aid that would 
trigger title VI coverage.ztt 
204. See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F .2d 418,430 (6th Cir . 1982) (concluding that 
where federal money supports the entire school, title IX's prohibition cannot cover the entire 
school because otherwise North Haven "loses all of its practical meaning"). 
205. See supra notes 125- 55 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Clarence Pendle-
ton, Chairman of the United States Civil Rights Commission, to Assistant Attorney General 
William Bradford Reynolds, Ill (Dec. 3, 1982) (arguing for a title IX interpretation similar to that 
of this Note) (on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review) . 
206. The Department administers a number of student-aid grant statutes . Sec, e.g., 20 
U.S.C. § 1070a (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Basic Educational Opportunity Grants). 
207. Even if student aid generally triggers title IX coverage, Guaranteed Student Loans 
(GSL's), 20 U.S .C. § 1077 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), a major form of federal student aid, may be 
contracts of guaranty within the meaning of§ 902's exemption . Sec Grove City College v. Harris, 
500 F. Supp. 253, 268 (W.O. Pa. 1980) (holding that GSL's were exempt), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F .2d 684, 690 n.IO (3d Cir. 1982) (GSL issue not 
presented on appeal), ccrt. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792); see also Hillsdale College 
v. HEW, 696 F .2d 418, 424 n.l7 (6th Cir. 1982) (issue of GSL exemption not reached) . 
208. H.R . Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 104- 05 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 2471-72. 
209. 110 Cong. Rec. 8359-60 (1964). 
210. See 110 Cong. ·Rec. 7056-57 (1964) (describing the discrimination in, and indicating title 
VI coverage of, schools that receive National Defense fellowships and National Science Founda-
tion fellowships) . 
211. Senator Humphrey stated that, by wntrast, direct assistance such as retirement benefits 
does not trigger title VI coverage since it is "irrelevant, to the purpose of these acts, what the 
recipient does with the money he receives." 110 Cong . Rec. 6545 (1964). The exception docs not 
,.. 
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This result is also supported by the contemporaneous legislatin: his tory 
of title IX. 212 During the floor debates on the 1971 version of title IX, Senator 
Bayh stated that: 
It is unquestionable, in my judgment, that [termination] would 
not be directed at specific assistance that was being received by 
individual students, but would be directed at the institution, and the 
Secretary would be expected to use good judgment as to how much 
leverage to apply, and where it could best be applied. 
The civil rights experience , as the Senator .. . knows, indicates 
that the very possibility of such a sanction has worked wonders . m 
Although the 1971 version of title IX incorpo rated the strict institutional 
approach and the present version is program -specific, Senator B:, ' \ ~t-.tc 
ment shows that Congress intended student aid to be a for:~. ·f ' 
financial assistance under title IX. 21 ~ The 1971 - 1972 change d id ated o .u; til,,, 
"program" cannot always refer to an entire school. 2 1" 
The postenactment history of title IX also justifies titl e IX coverage o n 
the basis of a school's receipt of student-aid funds . In 1975, opponents of title 
IX's broad reach offered amendments declaring that student-aid fu nds were 
not "Federal financial assistance. " 210 Senator Pell, the sponsor o f the BEOG 
apply to student aid . The purpose of student aid is tuition assistance . See 20 U .S.C. § 1070 (Supp . 
V 1981); see also Sobcrai-Perez v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 1164, 1171 - 73 (E .D.N.Y. 1982) 
(drawing this distinction between social security disability payments and student aid) . 
212. See 118 Cong . Rcc. 5803 (1972) ("The amendment would cover .. . scholar· 
ships .. . . "). 
213. 117 Cong. Rcc. 30,408 (1971) . 
214. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524 n.l4 (1982) (Court carried 
over certain congressional intentions from 1971 Senate version to 1972 version). 
215 . Sec supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. 
216. Senator Helms, 121 Cong. Rec. 23,R45 - 47 (1975), Senator Tower, 120 Cong. Rec. 
15,323 (1974), and Senator McClure, 122 Cong. Rcc. 28,136- 38 (1976), each sponsored amend-
ments to exempt student aid. See also Sex Discriminaton Regulations Hearings, supra note 15, at 
181. When Senator Rayh, in 1975, appeared before the hearings committee, R~prcsentative Quic 
inquired whether student aid triggered title IX coverage. Although the colloquy is confusing, 
Senator Bayh seems to suggest that the receipt of student aid funds docs lead to title IX coverage 
but that termination would typically be an inappropriate penalty . Representative Quic was plainly 
attempting to get Bayh to agre~ that student aid in no way leads to title IX coverage. 
Mr. Quie: But what gives authority to regulate, if you don't at the same time have . 
the authority to remove the funds as a sanction? 
Senator Bayh: Sir, I think you do. 
Mr. Quie: You stated there that they did not have that authority. 
Senator Bayh: To take it away from the students. 
Mr . Quie: Tha t is right. 
ld . But see Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418,426 n.22 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting only a later 
portion of the colloquy in which Quie is referring to coverage and Bayh seems to be referring to 
termination authority). 
The colloquy's ambiguity justifies avoiding any reliance on it as an indication of congressio-
nal intent. Nevertheless, 'Senator Bayh's conception or title IX supports this Note's interpretation. 
Only where discrimination has permeated a school can student aid be terminated. Sec Bob Jones 
Univ. v. Johnson, 396 f. Supp. 597 (D.S.C'. 1974) (title VI disnimination in admis;,ions autho-
rized the Veteran's Administration to terminate educational benefits), aff'd without opinion, 529 
F.2d 514 (4th Cir . 1975). One might argue that termination or student aid, partkularly to students 
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grant statute, the so-called Pell grants, opposed the amendments. 217 The one 
proposed amendment that reached the Senate floor was defeated.m That the 
amendment was proposed, debated, and defeated by the same Congress that 
did amend title IX in other ways lends strong support to recognizing title IX 
coverage on the basis of the school's receipt of student-aid funds. 219 
Congressional intent, embodied in the actual support standard , demands 
that when a school receives student-aid funds, the entire school must become a 
title IX program. 220 Student aid passes through student hands but it supports 
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with 
which the action is taken ." 20 U.S .C . § 1682 (1976) . This argument has not yet ari sen in the case 
law . Cf. Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 1982) (Edwards, C .. J., di ssenting) 
(arguing that termination of aid to students currently attending the school may be inappropriat e). 
217. Senator Pcll, opposing the McClure amendment, >tatcd that : 
The enactment of this amendment would mean that no fuud f; under [the >tutknt-aid 
program] would be covered by title IX. 
While these dollars are paid to students they flow through and ultimately go to 
institutions of higher education, and I do not believe we should take the position that 
these Federal funds can be used for further discrimination ... . 
122 Cong . Rec . 28,145 (1976). Senator Bayh also opposed exempting student aid . Sec id. at 
28,145- 46 (1976); sec also Grove City College v. Bell, 687 £' .2d 684, 694- 95 (3d Cir. 1982) (using 
these postenactmcnt developments to support its holding that a school's receipt of student -aid 
funds triggers title IX coverage), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1181 (1983) (No . 82-792) . 
218. Sec 122 Cong. Rcc. 28,147- 48 (1976) . 
219 . See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text. 
The school in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 
S. Ct. I 181 (1983) (No . 82-792), argued that receipt of student-aid funds should not trigger title IX 
coverage because the grants were "paid to students when the educational institution involved 
play[ed] no role in choosing the beneficiaries or designating amounts of aid"; sec also University 
of Richmond v. Bell, 543 r. Supp. 321, 330 (E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that student aid is not 
financial assistance but payment for services rendered). This argument has no merit. Schools can 
never determine the amount and nature of the aid they receive under a federal grant statute. 
Moreover, student-aid funds should be characterized as a type of federal assistance to schools . In 
addition to enabling a poor student to attend college, the funds provide financial assistance to the 
school. See Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 434 (6th Cir. 1982) (Edwards, C.J., 
dissenting); Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp . 597, 602-04 (D .S.C. 1974) (concluding 
that no rational distinction can turn on whether tuition aid is given directly to a school or to a 
student who, in turn, gives it to the school), aff'd without opinion, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). 
220. Under a student-aid program, the Department can enforce the§ 901 prohibition either 
by termination, subject to the limitations of the pinpoint provision, or by other means . If the 
school declines to sign an Assurance of Compliance, as in Grove City, the Department may 
terminate the student-aid funds without violating the pinpoint provision since the effects of 
termination are limited to the program that is not complying. The effect on the students who 
receive or would receive federal aid does not violate the pinpoint provision. The students' tuition 
finances should be interpreted to be part of the student -aid program . If the financial effects of 
termination on students were recognized, however, to violate the pinpoint provision, the Depart -
ment could limit its refusa l of student aid solely to potential students . Sec llillsdale College v. 
HEW, 696 F.2J 418, 437 (6th Cir. 1982) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) . Here the effect on these 
potential students is nonfinancial; they can attend other schools. Therefore, this form of termina-
tion enforcement does not violate the pinpoint provision, which only recognizes financial effects. 
See supra note I 75. 
After the school signs the Assurance of Compliance, the Department can enforce, by 
injunction, the § 901 prohibition as a contractual obligation. See supra note 93. Moreover, 
Congress may have in fact intended, sec 110 Cong. Rec. 7066 (1964), that, even when a school 
receives federal aid without signing a formal contract, the Department's othcr· llll'ans-cnforce-
ment authority includes the power to enforce the§ 901 prohibition by injutll.: tion. That is to say, 
the school's receipt of the aid implies a contract, and that contract can be enforced by injunrtion. 
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the entire school. 221 To the school it is simply a form of nonearmarked aid. 
Though one court has held that receipt of student-aid funds creates a school-
wide program, 222 several courts have ruled that student aid cannot trigger titk 
IX coverage. 223 These latter decisions do treat student aid as a nonearmarked 
grant but reason incorrectly that nonearmarked grants cannot trigger title IX 
coverage. 224 
Recently, the Sixth Circuit took another approach. It held, in Hillsdale 
Coffege v. HEW, 225 that a school's receipt of student -aid funds triggers title 
IX coverage, but not of the entire school. The program subject to title IX was 
the "student loan and grant prograrn." 2211 Tile court relied on the direct-
funding interpretation to conclude that an entire school can never be a title IX 
prograrn. 227 The court's attempt to establish a limited form of title IX cover-
age contravenes the legislative purpose of title IX. Student aid supports an 
entire school just as tuition does. The "student loan and grant program" is 
not the only part of the school that finds itself with increased funding by 
virtue of student-aid dollars. Even if one views the student as the focus of the 
grant, the actual-support standard dictates that the student-aid program al-
ways extends throughout the school. The money goes first to the student, but 
ends up in the school's general budget, actually supporting the entire 
school. 228 
CONCLUSION 
Although the current case law presents conflicting interpretations of title 
IX's program-specific reach into schools receiving federal aid, an analysis of 
the statutory scheme and the legislative history of title IX reveals that congres-
221. One education commentator has noted that the vast majority of institutions of higher 
education depend on federal student-aid funds. Finn, supra note 157, at 22 . 
222 . Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F .2d 684, 700 (3d C'ir. 19H2), ccrt. granted, 103 S. Ct. 
1181 ( 1983) (No. 82-792). The Third Circuit declined to articulate a general interpretation of 
program-specificity . ld. at 698 . 
- 223 . See University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 £' . Supp. 321, 332 n.l7 (E .D. Va . 1982); 
Bennett v. West Tex . State Univ ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80 (N .D. Tex. 19RI). 
224 . See Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp . 77 , 80 (N.D . Tex. 1981). This 
approach was shown earlier to be inconsistent with \:Ongressional intent; sec supra notes 90 -205 
and accompanying text. 
225. 696 F .2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982). This interpretation is shared by the Reagan administra-
tion . See Memorandum, supra note 164, at 2. 
226 . 1d . at 430. 
227 . 1d . at 427 . 
The court failed to rc-=ognize the significance of the other-means-enforcement and pinpoint 
provisions . The court assumed that accepting the notion that the student -aid program covered the 
entire school meant that discrimination in a single department would mandate termination of all 
student aid. ld . at 428 . Termination in this situation, however, would violate the pinpoint 
provision. Only school-wide discriminaton such as admissions discrimination or a failure to 
execute an Assurance of·Compliance, see Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 688 (3d Cir. 
1982), ccrt. granted, 103 S . Ct. 1181 (1983) (No. 82-792); 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(a) (1982), can result in 
termination of student aid. Where discrimination is limited, title IX can be enforced only by other 
means. Sec supra notes 69- 74 and accompanying tl'xt. 
228. Sec supra notes 217 (Senator Pcll's analysis of the function of student aid) and 221 
(student aid, in fact, supports many schools). 
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sional intent mandates an interpretation of program-specificity based on the 
following two propositions. First, the narrow scope of the Department •,,. 
termination authority must be distinguished from the scope of ti tle 1X " 
prohibition as enforced by "other means authorized by law." Second, the 
term "program" was not intended to refer to components of a school as 
defined from the educational perspective, but to refe r to that portion of a 
school actually supported by a particular federal grant statute. Under this 
inter-pretation, title IX's prohibi tion may or may not cover the entire school 
where coverage is based on receipt of a categorical grant, but must cover the 
entire school where coverage is based on the school' s receipt of nonearmnrl:cd 
aid or student-aid funds. 
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